Global Compliance Carbon Markets: Auction Mechanisms
グローバルコンプライアンス炭素市場:オークションメカニズム (AI 翻訳)
Yushuo Yang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本稿は、グローバルなコンプライアンス炭素市場(CCM)における排出枠のオークション方式を比較分析。無償配布からオークションへの移行が価格形成や市場効率に与える影響を評価し、投資業界や政策立案者に実践的示唆を提供する。CFA協会の調査報告書シリーズの一環。
English
This report reviews auction mechanisms in global compliance carbon markets (CCMs), analyzing the shift from free allocation to auctions and its impact on price formation, market efficiency, and stakeholder participation. It offers practical guidance for investors and policymakers on engaging with primary carbon markets.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本でもGX-ETSなど排出量取引制度の設計が進む中、オークション方式の国際比較は市場設計の参考となる。投資家視点からの評価は、国内市場への参加判断にも有用。
In the global GX context
As carbon markets expand globally (EU ETS, China, etc.), auction design is critical for price discovery and market integrity. This paper provides a cross-market benchmark for policymakers and investors evaluating auction mechanisms.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a comparative framework and market quality indicators for evaluating auction mechanisms across jurisdictions.
🏢実務担当者:Offers practical guidance on participating in carbon allowance auctions, including bid strategies and risk management.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights key design choices (e.g., auction frequency, price floor) that affect market outcomes and efficiency.
📄 Abstract(原文)
Executive Summary Carbon allowance allocation methods in global compliance carbon markets (CCMs) are key market design choices. The allocation of allowances influences the formation of carbon prices, the emission costs for covered entities, and market efficiency. The decision to allocate allowances freely or via auction mechanisms is a critical design feature that affects all stakeholders in the carbon market ecosystem, including covered emitters, market operators, financial intermediaries, and investment firms. In recent years, global CCMs have shifted from free allocation toward auction-based allowance distribution. The calibration of auction mechanisms is a policy choice that plays a critical role in determining market outcomes. This report reviews the auction mechanisms of global CCMs and evaluates their effectiveness, measured by various indicators of market quality. The research is designed to inform the investment industry about various auction mechanisms and to provide practical guidance on participating in auction markets. By reading this report, financial intermediaries and investment firms will be better informed to guide their decisions to participate in the primary market, while policymakers and market operators will be able to determine how best to calibrate allowance allocation in their respective markets. This report is the latest addition to CFA Institute Research and Policy Center’s carbon market research portfolio. Given the global expansion of carbon markets, Yang and Preece (2024) and Mak (2025) provided detailed overviews of global compliance and voluntary carbon markets, respectively, to help investment industry participants better understand their mechanisms. In light of the rapid growth of carbon-related trading products in secondary markets, Yang (2025) provided an in-depth analysis of the market structure of global CCMs’ secondary markets, offering practical guidance for the investment industry on engaging with CCMs.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.56227/26.1.8first seen 2026-05-17 07:41:14 · last seen 2026-05-20 05:26:36
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