Decisions on dual-channel closed-loop supply chains with trade-old-for-remanufactured and trade-ins under carbon trading mechanism and subsidy
炭素取引メカニズムと補助金の下でのリマニュファクチャリング取引と下取りを伴うデュアルチャネルクローズドループサプライチェーンの意思決定 (AI 翻訳)
Peng Zhang, Biao Zhao, Pin-bo Chen, Cunrui Ma
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、炭素取引メカニズムと政府補助金の下で、リマニュファクチャリング取引と下取りを伴うデュアルチャネルクローズドループサプライチェーンにおける企業の価格設定と回収戦略を分析する。Stackelbergゲームモデルを用いた結果、二重補助金はリマニュファクチャリング市場を拡大し利益を増やす一方、炭素取引は市場を縮小させることを示した。経営者と政策立案者に政策的調和の指針を提供する。
English
This study analyzes pricing and recovery strategies in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain with trade-old-for-remanufactured and trade-ins under carbon trading and subsidies. Using a Stackelberg game model, it finds that dual subsidies expand the remanufactured market and increase profits, while carbon trading contracts the market. It provides guidance for managers and policymakers on navigating conflicting regulations.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では炭素価格付けと循環経済政策が進展中であり、本論文は補助金と炭素取引の相互作用を明らかにすることで、政策設計や企業戦略に示唆を与える。特に、自動車や家電などのリマニュファクチャリング産業に参考となる。
In the global GX context
With carbon trading mechanisms expanding globally (e.g., EU ETS, China) and subsidies for circular economy, this paper offers insights into how these policies interact in supply chains. It highlights potential conflicts where carbon pricing may shrink remanufacturing markets, informing policy design for effective combinations.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Supply chain researchers can use the model to explore further policy interactions or extend to multi-period settings.
🏢実務担当者:Corporate sustainability managers can understand how carbon costs and subsidies affect remanufacturing profitability and customer incentives.
🏛政策担当者:Policymakers can learn that carbon trading alone may hinder circular economy goals, requiring complementary subsidies.
📄 Abstract（原文）
To advance the circular economy, policymakers are increasingly using tools such as carbon trading mechanisms and government subsidies. However, how these policies jointly affect firms’ strategies in such a competitive supply chain setting, a dual-channel closed-loop system featuring both trade-old-for-remanufactured and trade-in schemes, remains unclear. To this end, this study employs a Stackelberg game model to analyze how supply chain actors determine their pricing and recovery strategies when subject to both carbon trading and a dual-subsidy system. Our results reveal a clear divergence between two policy instruments. Dual subsidies consistently expand the market for remanufactured products and increase collected volumes, boosting profits for both firms and enhancing social welfare. In contrast, carbon trading mechanism, while also potentially increasing firm profits, tends to contract remanufacturing market and collection efforts. This research contributes by simultaneously modelling critical and interacting policies. It offers clear guidance for managers on navigating conflicting regulations and for policymakers on designing more effective policy combinations.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.5267/j.ijiec.2026.2.009first seen 2026-05-05 22:51:10
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