Evolutionary Game Analysis of MRV Governance and Third-Party Verification in Building Carbon Markets
建築炭素市場におけるMRVガバナンスと第三者検証の進化ゲーム分析 (AI 翻訳)
Qiuhu Shao, Junchi Liu, Shiyao Zhu
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
中国の「双炭戦略」下での建築部門炭素市場を対象に、MRV制度の課題（企業のコンプライアンス意欲不足、規制コスト、第三者検証の独立性）を分析。政府・企業・検証機関の三者進化ゲームモデルにより、適度な監督と成果連動型インセンティブが長期的安定をもたらすことを示し、段階的罰則やグリーン技術導入促進策を提言。
English
This study analyzes MRV governance challenges in China's building carbon market under the dual-carbon strategy. Using a three-player evolutionary game model (government, firms, third-party verifiers), it finds that moderate supervision and performance-based incentives achieve long-term stability. Policy recommendations include tiered penalties and incentives for green technology adoption.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
中国ETSのMRV課題を扱うが、日本のGX-ETSやカーボンプライシング制度設計にも示唆を与える。特に第三者検証の独立性とインセンティブ設計は、日本の排出量取引制度の信頼性向上に参考となる。
In the global GX context
While focused on China, this paper offers insights for global carbon market governance, particularly on MRV integrity and third-party verification. The evolutionary game approach can inform policy design in other ETS contexts, including the EU ETS and emerging Asian markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic framework for analyzing MRV governance dynamics, applicable to other carbon markets.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights the importance of balanced supervision and incentives for third-party verifiers in carbon markets.
🏛政策担当者:Offers evidence-based policy recommendations for strengthening MRV systems and enforcement in emissions trading schemes.
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study examines the governance of building carbon markets in the context of China’s “dual-carbon strategy”, focusing specifically on the integration of Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems. The study identifies critical challenges in China’s emissions-trading scheme (ETS), such as weak corporate compliance incentives, high regulatory costs, and concerns about third-party verification independence, which hinder the effectiveness of carbon pricing and technology adoption. Using a three-player evolutionary game model involving the government, carbon-emitting firms, and third-party verifiers, the study finds that moderate government supervision, performance-based incentives, and stronger penalties lead to long-term stability and optimal governance. Based on these findings, policy recommendations are made, including tiered penalties, targeted incentives for green technology adoption, and the strengthening of third-party verification mechanisms to enhance market governance and support China’s carbon-reduction goals in the building sector.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openaire https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings15193625first seen 2026-05-05 19:06:46
🔔 こうした論文の新着を逃したくない方は キーワードアラート に登録（無料・3キーワードまで）。
gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。