Random Carbon Tax Policy and Investment Into Emission Abatement Technologies
ランダム炭素税政策と排出削減技術への投資 (AI 翻訳)
Katia Colaneri, Rüdiger Frey, Verena Köck
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
論文は、ランダムな炭素税政策下での電力会社の排出削減技術への投資決定を分析。税リスクのある確率モデルと、不確実性回避のゲーム理論モデルの2つを考究。決定論的課税よりも投資が減少する傾向を示す一方、不確実性回避の場合には投資が増加する可能性を発見。
English
This paper analyzes investment decisions in emission abatement technologies by an electricity producer facing random carbon taxes. It considers both a precise probabilistic model (tax risk) and an uncertainty-averse differential game framework. Findings show that tax risk generally reduces investment compared to deterministic taxation, but uncertainty aversion may lead to increased investment.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
本論文は日本にも直接的な政策含意を持つ。炭素税の不確実性が企業の脱炭素投資に与える影響を理論的に示しており、日本の炭素価格導入の議論において、税制の信頼性と予見可能性の重要性を示唆している。
In the global GX context
This paper has global relevance in understanding carbon tax policy design. It demonstrates that policy uncertainty can hinder investment in abatement technologies, supporting the need for stable and credible carbon pricing mechanisms such as those under consideration in the EU and other regions.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides rigorous mathematical treatment of carbon tax uncertainty and abatement investment, with novel results on uncertainty aversion.
🏢実務担当者:Offers insights on how carbon tax uncertainty affects investment strategies, useful for corporate planning under evolving climate policies.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights that tax certainty and credibility can increase abatement investment, while uncertainty may reduce it, informing policy design.
📄 Abstract（原文）
ABSTRACT We analyze the problem of a profit‐maximizing electricity producer, subject to carbon taxes, who decides on investments into abatement technologies. We assume that the carbon tax policy is random and that the investment in the abatement technology is divisible, irreversible, and subject to transaction costs. Two frameworks for randomness in taxes are considered. First, we assume a precise probabilistic model for the tax process, namely a pure jump Markov process (so‐called tax‐risk). Second, we analyze the case of a producer who is uncertainty‐averse with respect to the tax evolution and who uses a differential game as conceptual tool to decide on optimal production and investment. We provide a rigorous mathematical treatment of both settings, including the analysis of the associated nonlinear PDEs. Numerical methods are employed to investigate the optimal investment strategies. We find that in the tax‐risk case, investment in abatement technologies is generally lower than in a benchmark scenario with deterministic taxation. Nevertheless, factors such as production technology, investment divisibility, tax rebates, and credibility of the tax policy introduce interesting twists. In contrast, the uncertainty‐averse framework may lead to increased investment as uncertainty rises.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- crossref https://doi.org/10.1111/mafi.70031first seen 2026-05-14 23:07:36
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