Incentive Mechanism Design in a Low-Carbon Service Supply Chain Under Dual Information Asymmetry: Consumer Heterogeneity, Information Perception, and Dynamic Trust

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:Principal-agent models for low-carbon supply chain governance with dual information asymmetry and consumer perception dynamics.

🏢実務担当者:Use menu contracts and disclosure investments to align supplier incentives with actual emission reductions, especially when consumer trust is built over time.

🏛政策担当者:Consider that disclosure policies (e.g., carbon labeling) enhance incentive effectiveness only if they convert real performance into perceived value, and trust requires sustained effort.

Low-carbon service outsourcing creates a governance problem in which manufacturers must address hidden emission-reduction capability before contracting and hidden effort after contracting. Consumer low-carbon preference does not automatically translate into market returns, because consumers rely on information disclosure, certification, carbon labeling, and traceability to perceive actual emission-reduction performance. This study develops a principal–agent model for a low-carbon service supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a low-carbon service provider. The baseline model examines screening and effort incentives under dual information asymmetry, the extended static model introduces heterogeneous consumer preferences and information perception, and the dynamic model incorporates consumer trust evolution. The results show that menu contracts enable manufacturers to distinguish service-provider types and induce emission-reduction effort, but truthful self-selection requires information rent. Consumer low-carbon preference strengthens incentive intensity only when disclosure converts actual emission-reduction performance into perceived low-carbon value. Disclosure investment improves the market return of emission-reduction effort, but its effectiveness is constrained by disclosure cost, provider risk aversion, and output uncertainty. Consumer low-carbon trust converges to a steady state supported by sustained emission-reduction effort and credible disclosure. The conclusions apply primarily to low-carbon service outsourcing settings in which provider capability and effort are difficult to observe and market response depends on consumers’ perception of low-carbon information. This study extends principal–agent analysis to low-carbon service supply chains and shows that effective low-carbon governance depends on the coordination of contract incentives, information disclosure, and trust accumulation.

• openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14050550first seen 2026-05-21 04:48:45