A game-theoretic analysis of production and coordination under combined carbon policies
複合炭素政策下における生産と調整のゲーム理論的分析 (AI 翻訳)
Ao Qiao, Siyu Zeng, Jianing Wang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究はキャップ・アンド・トレードと低炭素補助金を組み合わせた複合政策下で、メーカーと小売業者の調整をゲーム理論で分析した。生産プロセスを待ち行列モデル化し、政策と契約の組み合わせを比較。その結果、複合政策は収益性と持続可能性を向上させ、グリーン投資補助金が効果的であることを示した。
English
This study uses a Stackelberg game model to analyze coordination between a manufacturer and retailer under combined carbon policies including cap-and-trade and low-carbon subsidies. It models production details with queuing theory to capture operational impacts on emissions. Findings show that combined policies enhance profitability and sustainability, with green investment subsidies being more effective than product subsidies. Cost-sharing contracts provide a better balance between economic and environmental objectives.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本の炭素価格政策（例：GXリーグや排出量取引の試行）の設計に示唆を与える。複合政策のサプライチェーン全体への効果をモデル化した点が新規であり、政策立案者は補助金と排出量取引の併用効果を考慮すべきである。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to the global literature on carbon policy interactions, particularly the combined effect of cap-and-trade and subsidies. It offers a novel operational perspective by integrating lot-sizing and queuing theory into policy analysis, relevant for countries designing integrated climate policy packages.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic model for analyzing combined carbon policies and supply chain coordination with operational details.
🏢実務担当者:Offers insights on how different subsidy schemes and contracts affect emissions and profitability under combined policies.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights the effectiveness of combining cap-and-trade with green investment subsidies and the importance of contract design.
📄 Abstract（原文）
To mitigate the growing threat of global warming, countries have increasingly adopted carbon policies to control industrial carbon emissions. Although previous research has analysed the effectiveness of individual carbon policies, such as cap-and-trade and subsidy schemes, the combined effects of these policies remain largely unexplored. Moreover, existing studies often overlook detailed production processes, such as lot-sizing decisions, which significantly influence total emissions of the manufacturer. To bridge these gaps, this study examines the coordination between a manufacturer and a retailer under a combined carbon policy framework, incorporating both cap-and-trade and low-carbon subsidy policies. A Stackelberg game model is developed to explore the strategic decisions of supply chain members. The manufacturer’s production process is modelled using queuing theory to capture the impact of operational details on carbon emissions. Supply chain scenarios are compared and analysed under different combinations of carbon policies and contractual arrangements. The results demonstrate that a combined carbon policy can enhance both profitability and sustainability across the supply chain. Among subsidy schemes, the green investment subsidy is more effective than product subsidy in emissions reduction. Additionally, while revenue-sharing contracts yield greater emissions reductions, cost-sharing contracts offer a better balance between economic and environmental objectives. These findings offer practical implications for policymakers and supply chain managers aiming to design integrated strategies that simultaneously achieve profitability and sustainability.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0336358first seen 2026-05-05 23:46:41
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