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Manufacturers’ Trade-in Channel Selection in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Carbon Cap-And-Trade and Carbon Tax Policies

炭素キャップ・アンド・トレードと炭素税政策下における閉ループサプライチェーン内のメーカーのトレードイン・チャネル選択 (AI 翻訳)

Hongchun Wang, Haiyue Yin, Caifeng Lin

Sustainability📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-04-08#炭素価格Origin: CN
DOI: 10.3390/su18083671
原典: https://doi.org/10.3390/su18083671
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🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

本研究は、キャップ・アンド・トレードと炭素税のハイブリッド政策下での閉ループサプライチェーンにおけるトレードイン・チャネル選択を分析。ゲーム理論モデルを用いて、メーカー主導の3つのチャネル（M-CX、R-CX、T-CX）を比較。炭素税はメーカーの利益を圧縮する一方、キャップ・アンド・トレードは非線形のU字効果を示す。T-CXチャネルは高炭素強度下で最も高い排出削減を達成する緩衝機構を持つ。

English

This study analyzes trade-in channel selection in a closed-loop supply chain under a hybrid carbon policy combining cap-and-trade and carbon tax. Using game-theoretic models for three manufacturer-led channels (M-CX, R-CX, T-CX), it finds that carbon tax compresses profits while cap-and-trade has a U-shaped effect. The T-CX channel creates a buffering mechanism through rising rebates, achieving the highest emission reductions under high carbon intensity.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本では2023年度からGXリーグによるカーボンプライシングの本格運用が始まった。本論文のハイブリッド政策分析は、排出量取引と炭素税の併用を検討する日本の政策設計に示唆を与える。特に、チャネル選択が排出削減効果に与える影響は、企業のGX投資判断に有用。

In the global GX context

This paper contributes to the global debate on hybrid carbon pricing mechanisms, which are increasingly adopted (e.g., EU ETS + carbon tax proposals). The finding that third-party trade-in channels can buffer emission reductions under high carbon intensity offers insights for designing supply chain policies that align with net-zero targets.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:Provides game-theoretic models for channel selection under hybrid carbon policies, useful for extending to other regulatory contexts.

🏢実務担当者:Manufacturers can use the findings to choose trade-in channels that balance profitability and emission reductions under carbon pricing.

🏛政策担当者:Highlights how channel structure affects policy effectiveness, informing the design of hybrid carbon regimes.

📄 Abstract（原文）

This study investigates trade-in channel selection in a closed-loop supply chain under a hybrid carbon policy framework that integrates cap-and-trade and carbon taxation. Game-theoretic models are developed for three manufacturer-led channels: manufacturer trade-in (M-CX), retailer trade-in (R-CX), and third-party trade-in (T-CX). The analysis examines pricing strategies, profitability, and carbon emission reductions across these channels. The key findings are as follows: (1) Carbon tax consistently compresses manufacturer profits, whereas cap-and-trade mechanisms exhibit a non-linear U-shaped effect. Manufacturer profits remain highest under the M-CX channel, irrespective of policy intensity. (2) Retail prices are most sensitive to carbon policies under the T-CX channel, where trade-in rebates increase with carbon intensity. The R-CX channel sustains higher retail prices and rebates than M-CX, while T-CX surpasses both under conditions of high carbon intensity. (3) Carbon emission reductions decline sharply under M-CX and R-CX as policy stringency increases. In contrast, the T-CX channel establishes a buffering mechanism through rising rebates, exhibiting the slowest rate of decline. At low carbon intensity, T-CX yields the lowest reduction levels; however, under high intensity, it overtakes the other channels to achieve the highest reduction. This study offers insights for manufacturers’ channel selection and government policy coordination under hybrid carbon regulation regimes.

🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース

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