Toward 2035: exploring a transition plan of the CAFC-NEV credits policy for NEV in China
2035年に向けて：中国のNEV向けCAFC-NEVクレジット政策の移行計画の探求 (AI 翻訳)
Nan-nan Liu, Shuyu Chen, Jun Kong, Tianze Zhang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、中国の自動車産業におけるCAFC-NEVクレジット政策から炭素排出管理への移行計画を、内燃機関車と新エネルギー車を製造・販売するサプライチェーンの微分ゲームモデルを用いて分析。炭素クレジットの導入が資本ストックやグッドウィルに影響を与えず、特定条件下でメーカーと小売業者の最適均衡解を高めることを示した。また、CAFC-NEVクレジット廃止は小売業者よりもメーカーの利益に大きな影響を与える。
English
This paper examines the transition from China's CAFC-NEV credits policy to a carbon emission management system using a differential game model of a supply chain producing both ICEVs and NEVs. Results show that introducing carbon credits does not affect capital stock or goodwill, and under certain conditions yields higher optimal equilibria. Abolishing CAFC-NEV credits affects manufacturer profits more than retailer profits. Empirical analysis shows profit margin differences less than 7% and 1% respectively.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
本論文は中国のCAFC-NEVクレジット政策から炭素クレジットへの移行を分析しており、日本における自動車産業のカーボンプライシング政策やEV移行計画の検討に示唆を与える。特に、クレジット廃止がメーカーと小売業者に与える影響の違いは、日本の政策設計においても考慮すべきポイントである。
In the global GX context
This paper offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of China's shift from vehicle fuel economy credits to carbon emission management, a trend relevant to global climate policy. The differential game model reveals supply chain implications that can inform policy design in other markets, including the EU and US, as they consider integrating EV credits with carbon pricing.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:GX researchers can use this model to analyze policy transition effects on supply chain decisions.
🏢実務担当者:Corporate sustainability teams in automotive supply chains can apply insights on profit implications of moving from credits to carbon pricing.
🏛政策担当者:Regulators considering transitioning from vehicle credits to carbon pricing can learn from China's modeled outcomes.
📄 Abstract（原文）
As the penetration rate of new energy vehicles in China continues to rise, the incentive effect of the CAFC-NEV credits policy has gradually weakened. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology therefore proposes to transform the CAFC-NEV credits policy into carbon emission management policy. Focusing on the transition plan for CAFC-NEV credits of automotive industry in China, this paper constructs a differential game model of the supply chain that simultaneously manufactures and sells internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) and new energy vehicle (NEV), so as to examine the transitional effect of carbon credit on CAFC-NEV credits. The results show that: (1) Implementing carbon credit for NEV on the basis of the current CAFC-NEV credits does not affect capital stock or goodwill. (2) Within a specific range of NEV standard type credit and proportional requirement, the optimal equilibrium solutions for manufacturer and retailer are higher under the carbon credit compared to the CAFC-NEV credits scenario. (3) Neither the single-channel nor the dual-channel sales model affects the basic conclusions of the research. (4) The abolition of CAFC-NEV credits exerts a greater impact on manufacturer’s profit than on retailer’s. Empirical analysis reveals that the profit margins for manufacturer and retailer under the CAFC-NEV credits and carbon credit differ by less than 7% and 1% respectively. This study provides a theoretical basis for promoting the transformation of automotive industry policy from CAFC-NEV credits to carbon emission management in China.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2026.1737840first seen 2026-05-05 22:25:06
gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。