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Impact of Unit Carbon Quota Mechanism on Clean Energy Investment Strategies: A Biform Game Analysis

単位炭素割当メカニズムがクリーンエネルギー投資戦略に与える影響：バイフォームゲーム分析 (AI 翻訳)

Wei Chen, Ruonan Zhu, Jing Chen

IEEE transactions on engineering management📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-01-01#炭素価格
DOI: 10.1109/tem.2026.3683708
原典: https://doi.org/10.1109/tem.2026.3683708

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

本論文は、電力サプライチェーンにおけるクリーンエネルギー投資を分析し、単位炭素割当メカニズム（UCM）の効果をバイフォームゲームで検討。低排出時はUCMが投資と需要を促進するが、高排出時はUCMなしの方が高い投資と需要をもたらす。炭素価格上昇の影響も排出水準に依存する。

English

This study uses a biform game to analyze clean energy investment in an electricity supply chain under a unit carbon quota mechanism (UCM). It finds that UCM promotes investment and demand only when unit carbon emissions are low; under high emissions, no-UCM yields better outcomes. Higher carbon prices have opposing effects depending on emissions levels.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本のGX政策では炭素価格導入が検討されており、本分析は排出量水準に応じた政策効果の違いを示唆する。特に、排出量が高い段階ではUCMが逆効果となる可能性があり、日本の産業構造に応じた慎重な設計が必要である。

In the global GX context

This paper contributes to global carbon pricing debates by showing that unit carbon quotas can backfire under high-emission regimes. It underscores the importance of calibrating carbon mechanisms to sectoral emission levels, relevant for policymakers designing carbon markets or border adjustments.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic model linking carbon quota design to clean energy investment, useful for extending to other market structures or dynamic settings.

🏢実務担当者:Highlights that carbon quota mechanisms may not always incentivize clean energy investment, cautioning corporate strategy teams to consider emission intensity levels.

🏛政策担当者:Emphasizes that unit carbon quotas are most effective when baseline emissions are low, suggesting phased or sector-specific implementation.

📄 Abstract（原文）

This study investigates clean energy investment decisions in an electricity supply chain, focusing on the unit carbon quota mechanism (UCM). Using a biform game framework that combines noncooperative pricing with cooperative investment, we compare equilibrium outcomes with and without the UCM. We find that: 1) the UCM does not universally stimulate clean energy investment. When unit carbon emissions are low, the UCM promotes investment and expands electricity demand; when unit carbon emissions are high, the no-UCM scenario instead yields higher investment and demand. 2) Under low unit carbon emissions, upstream producer profits, downstream retailer profits, and social welfare are higher with the UCM; under high unit carbon emissions, these outcomes are higher without the UCM. 3) When unit carbon emissions are low, a higher carbon price reduces both wholesale and retail electricity prices while increasing clean energy investment and demand; when unit carbon emissions are high, a higher carbon price increases wholesale and retail prices but suppresses investment and demand.

🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース

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