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Green disclosure policies and market dynamics: evidence from agent-based ESG models

グリーン情報開示政策と市場動態:エージェントベースのESGモデルからのエビデンス (AI 翻訳)

Zhao, Lingxiao, Polukarov, Maria, Ventre, Carmine; id_orcid 0000-0003-1464-1215

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systemsプレプリント2026-02-07#開示インフラOrigin: Global
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-026-09734-y
原典: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-026-09734-y

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

本研究は、グリーン開示政策が企業のグリーン移行と市場均衡に与える影響を、エージェントベースシミュレーションと経験的ゲーム理論を用いて分析した。EUと中国の比較から、厳格な開示は差別化を促進するが移行コストが高い場合に抑制的であり、ハイブリッド開示が効果的であることを示した。

English

This paper studies how green disclosure policies affect firms' green transition and market equilibrium using agent-based simulation and empirical game theory. Comparing EU and China, it finds that strict disclosure sharpens differentiation but may suppress upgrading if costs are high, while hybrid disclosure generates stronger incentives across firm types.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本はSSBJによる開示基準策定中であり、市場成熟度に応じた開示制度設計の参考になる。特に、厳格な開示と緩やかな開示の段階的導入(ハイブリッド型)の有効性は、日本のGX政策に示唆を与える。

In the global GX context

As global disclosure regimes like ISSB and CSRD evolve, this paper provides a framework for assessing the market-level impacts of different disclosure stringency levels. The hybrid disclosure model is particularly relevant for emerging economies and developed markets alike.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:Agent-based modeling and game-theoretic analysis offer a novel approach to study disclosure policy impacts on market dynamics.

🏢実務担当者:Corporate sustainability teams can use the findings to anticipate market reactions to different disclosure regimes and plan transition strategies accordingly.

🏛政策担当者:Regulators can benefit from the comparative analysis of disclosure stringency across market maturities, especially the hybrid approach for balancing transition costs and incentives.

📄 Abstract(原文)

Abstract Green disclosure policies aim to improve the transparency of corporate environmental practices and guide investors’ capital allocation. While existing studies mostly examine firm-level effects, their market-level implications in multi-agent systems remain insufficiently explored. This paper develops a dual-market dynamic ESG fund model, integrating agent-based simulation with empirical game-theoretic analysis, to study how upgrade costs, investor valuation preferences, and disclosure regimes jointly shape firms’ green transition incentives in the EU and China. The results show that both transition costs and valuation gaps strongly influence strategic upgrading behaviour and equilibrium outcomes: Strict disclosure sharpens differentiation but may suppress upgrading due to high costs; lax disclosure facilitates initial transitions by polluting firms; and hybrid disclosure, combining lax and strict phases, generates stronger incentives across different firm types. Cross-market comparison further indicates that the EU’s mature regulatory environment is better suited to strict disclosure, whereas China’s emerging market benefits more from a lax form to accelerate early-stage transitions. This study provides a reference for regulators in selecting appropriate disclosure forms at different levels of market maturity and offers methodological support for the sustainable development of green finance markets.

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