Green Financing for SMEs in Supply Chain Under the Reward–Penalty Mechanism: Reverse Factoring or Bank Credit
報奨・罰則メカニズム下でのサプライチェーンにおける中小企業のグリーンファイナンス：リバースファクタリングか銀行融資か (AI 翻訳)
Zheng Zhang, Wenhao Shen, Xiaran Zhang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、政府の報奨・罰則メカニズムのもとで、サプライチェーンにおける中小企業のグリーンファイナンス戦略として、リバースファクタリングと伝統的な銀行融資を比較分析した。ゲーム理論モデルを用いた結果、高い環境格付けを持つ中小企業はリバースファクタリングを選択し、環境と経済の両面で利益を向上させることが示された。また、報奨・罰則メカニズムはグリーンファイナンスの効果を補完的に高めることが明らかになった。
English
This study models green financing for SMEs in supply chains, comparing reverse factoring and bank credit under government reward-penalty mechanisms. Using game theory, it finds that SMEs with higher environmental ratings prefer reverse factoring, which boosts both environmental and economic benefits. The reward-penalty mechanism complements green financing by enhancing its effectiveness.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本でも、大企業のサプライチェーンにおける中小企業の排出削減が課題となっており、本論文のリバースファクタリングと報奨・罰則メカニズムの分析は、実務的な示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to global GX discourse by modeling how government mechanisms can steer SMEs toward green financing in supply chains, a critical but understudied area for Scope 3 decarbonization.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:The game-theoretic model provides a framework to analyze the interaction between green financing and regulatory mechanisms in supply chains.
🏢実務担当者:Practitioners can evaluate whether reverse factoring or bank credit is more suitable for financing green SMEs, considering environmental ratings and government incentives.
🏛政策担当者:Policymakers can use the findings to design reward-penalty systems that effectively promote green financing for SMEs without excessive fiscal burden.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) play a significant role in the socio‐economic framework and their production and operation management is one of the most major factors leading to resource waste, energy consumption, and environmental degradation, which has garnered considerable attention from governments around the world. The primary impediment to pollution control in SMEs is widely recognized as financial constraints, and effective supply chain management is essential to addressing this issue. This research explores heterogeneous green financing strategies for SMEs in supply chains, including reverse factoring (RF) and traditional bank credit ( BC ), under the government reward–penalty mechanism (RPM). By formulating game models over four scenarios, some intriguing results were derived: (1) Compared to BC , SMEs with higher environmental ratings and endorsement of core enterprise credits opt for RF, which simultaneously boosts both environmental and economic benefits. (2) The government indirectly regulates the pollution of SMEs via supply chain tools, enhancing the effects of green financing with a lower reward–penalty benchmark, while its choice of rewards or punishments impacts the pollution control system differently. (3) The RPM can broaden the scope and enhance the extent of RF's advantages. (4) The RPM and green financing have complementary effects in the pollution control of SMEs.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70085first seen 2026-05-05 22:02:49
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