The Impact of Carbon Tax and Green Credit on Competing Manufacturers’ Economic and Environmental Performances
炭素税とグリーンクレジットが競合企業の経済・環境パフォーマンスに与える影響 (AI 翻訳)
Shuting Xu, Juanling Lin, Huantao Liang, Qingquan Jiang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、炭素税とグリーンクレジットが競争市場における製造業者の技術更新と経済・環境パフォーマンスに与える影響を、ナッシュモデルとスタッケルベルクモデルを用いて分析。技術更新企業は経済的に優位だが、高い炭素税率は環境優位性を低下させ、低いグリーンクレジット割引は必ずしも利益増につながらないことを示した。競争構造の変化が排出量に影響するため、政策立案者は炭素税率の動的調整やグリーンクレジット割引の最適化が重要と結論。
English
This paper uses game-theoretic models to examine how carbon tax and green credit jointly affect technology upgrading and economic/environmental performance of competing manufacturers. Findings show that while upgrading firms outperform economically, high carbon tax can erode their environmental advantage, and low green credit discounts do not guarantee higher profits. Changes in competitive structure can increase total emissions, suggesting policymakers should dynamically adjust tax rates and credit discounts.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではGXリーグやカーボンプライシングの導入が進んでおり、炭素税とグリーンクレジットの組み合わせ効果を競争市場で分析した本論文は、国内の政策設計や企業の技術投資判断に示唆を与える。特に、競争構造の違いが排出量に与える影響は、日本企業のサプライチェーン戦略にも応用可能。
In the global GX context
This research contributes to the global debate on the optimal design of carbon pricing and green finance policies, particularly in competitive manufacturing sectors. The findings on how policy mix and market structure interact provide insights for jurisdictions like the EU and China that implement carbon taxes alongside green credit schemes, highlighting the need for dynamic policy adjustments.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Theoretically models policy mix effects on technology adoption under competition, offering testable hypotheses for empirical work.
🏢実務担当者:Manufacturers can use insights on when technology upgrading is profitable under different carbon tax and green credit regimes.
🏛政策担当者:Demonstrates that carbon tax and green credit must be coordinated with market structure to avoid unintended emission increases.
📄 Abstract（原文）
With increasingly stringent global environmental governance, carbon tax and green credit have become two typical policy instruments widely used to promote green transformation. However, their combined effects on technology upgrading in competitive markets remain underexplored. This paper examines a policy setting where two instruments are implemented in a market comprising both technology-maintaining and technology-upgrading manufacturers. Two game-theoretic models are developed: a Nash model for simultaneous competition and a Stackelberg model for sequential competition. The key findings are as follows: (1) Under both competition scenarios, the technology-upgrading manufacturer exhibits superior economic performance. However, excessively high carbon tax rates may erode its environmental performance advantage. Moreover, while a lower green credit discount can facilitate technology upgrading, it does not necessarily yield higher profits for the manufacturer. (2) When the technology-upgrading manufacturer shifts from competing simultaneously to taking a leading role, it will lower its technology upgrading level, whereas both manufacturers’ profits increase. Numerical experiments reveal that under a high carbon tax rate or a low green credit discount, such a change in the competitive sequence may increase total carbon emissions. The policymakers should dynamically increase the carbon tax rate or reduce the green credit discount to balance economic and environmental performances.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- crossref https://doi.org/10.1142/s0217595926500181first seen 2026-05-14 23:12:33
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