Strategic Choices of Carbon Trading Modes for Competing Manufacturers Under the Cap-and-Trade Policy
キャップ・アンド・トレード政策下における競合製造業者の炭素排出権取引モードの戦略的選択 (AI 翻訳)
Xuemei Zhang, Qiang Hu, Xiao Jiang, Tingyuan Lou
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、キャップ・アンド・トレード政策下で競合する低炭素製造業者と従来型製造業者の間の炭素排出権取引モードの選択を分析する。外部市場取引と内部合意取引の二つのモードを比較し、内部炭素価格の範囲で両者の利益が改善される条件を明らかにした。中国鉄鋼業の実データによる検証も行っている。
English
This study develops a duopolistic game model under cap-and-trade policy, analyzing competing manufacturers' choice between external carbon market trading and internal trading agreements. It finds conditions for Pareto improvement in profits within a certain internal carbon price range when the low-carbon manufacturer's quota surplus is insufficient. Numerical analysis based on China's steel industry validates the theoretical results.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本でもカーボンプライシングの導入が進む中、排出権取引市場での企業間の取引形態の選択は重要な課題である。本論文の内部取引協定の分析は、サプライチェーン内での取り組みに参考になる。
In the global GX context
This paper provides a game-theoretic analysis of carbon trading mode selection under cap-and-trade, relevant to the EU ETS, China's national ETS, and emerging carbon markets globally. It highlights conditions where internal agreements outperform external markets, offering insights for both firms and regulators.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Game-theoretic modeling of carbon trading mode choices provides a framework for further studies on firm strategies under cap-and-trade.
🏢実務担当者:Manufacturers can use the Pareto conditions to evaluate whether internal carbon trading agreements with partners may be more beneficial than market trading.
🏛政策担当者:Regulators should consider how the availability of internal trading agreements affects market liquidity and policy effectiveness.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Confronted with the constraints of global carbon reduction mandates and the widespread implementation of cap-and-trade (CAT) policy, competing manufacturers face critical choices in carbon quota trading, such as engaging in external markets or internal agreements. We develop a duopolistic game model comprising a low-carbon manufacturer (MG) and a traditional manufacturer (MT) under a CAT framework. In a perfect carbon quota trading market, manufacturers simultaneously cooperate and compete, facing a strategic choice between external trading through the open carbon market and internal trading agreements. We investigate how the low-carbon development level, carbon quota surplus, and internal carbon price affect their choices of carbon quota trading modes. Analytical results indicate that in the scenario where MG’s quota surplus is insufficient to fully meet MT’s demand, both manufacturers can achieve Pareto improvement in their respective profits within a certain range of internal carbon prices. Otherwise, the internal trading agreements may only guarantee an increase in their aggregate profits. A numerical analysis based on the actual situation of China’s steel industry verifies the theoretical conclusions.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/math14132441first seen 2026-07-09 05:12:49
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