Integrating ESG Principles into Directors Fiduciary Duties: A Legal Framework for Regulatory Application
ESG原則の取締役受託者義務への統合：規制適用のための法的枠組み (AI 翻訳)
Sipei Zhou
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、EUのCSRDから米SECの気候開示提案、日本の東京電力13.3兆円判決に至るまで、ESG監視が資本市場アクセスの事実上のグローバルミニマムとなったことを指摘。デラウェア州のCaremark原則、ドイツの組織的監督義務、日本の低ハードル株主代表訴訟制度を比較分析し、中国会社法向けの移植可能な枠組みを提案する。結論として、ESGは忠実義務ではなく注意義務に基づき、取締役会レベルのリスク管理セーフハーバーとインセント化された報酬によって制度化されるべきと主張する。
English
This paper argues that ESG oversight has become a de facto global minimum for capital market access, citing the EU's CSRD, SEC climate proposals, and Japan's TEPCO judgment. Through comparative analysis of Delaware's Caremark doctrine, Germany's codified oversight duty, and Japan's low-threshold derivative enforcement, it proposes a transplantable framework for China's 2023 Company Law. The study finds ESG is best institutionalized anchored in the duty of care, operationalized via a board-level risk management safe harbor and incentive-aligned remuneration.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではSSBJ基準や有報でのESG情報開示が進む中、取締役の受託者義務とESGの法的統合は実務上の重要論点。東京地判平成30年（ワ）第3632号等の判例動向や、2023年会社法改正の議論にも示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
Globally, as jurisdictions like the EU (CSRD), US (SEC), and others tighten ESG disclosure mandates, the legal integration of ESG into fiduciary duties remains fragmented. This paper offers a comparative framework that could inform regulatory reforms and corporate practice, particularly for jurisdictions seeking to move beyond voluntary ESG commitments.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a comparative legal analysis and theoretical framework (reflexive law) for integrating ESG into fiduciary duties across jurisdictions.
🏢実務担当者:Offers concrete legislative and board-level design suggestions (e.g., duty of care anchoring, safe harbor, incentive-aligned remuneration) that can guide corporate governance reforms.
🏛政策担当者:Delivers a transplantable legal model for regulators (especially in China) to codify ESG oversight in company law and governance codes.
📄 Abstract（原文）
From the EUs Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive to the SECs climate disclosure proposals and Japans 13.3 trillion TEPCO judgment, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) oversight has become a de facto global minimum for access to capital markets, yet directors fiduciary duties continue to oscillate between shareholder primacy and indeterminate stakeholder rhetoric. This asymmetry fosters greenwashing, regulatory arbitrage, and strike suits, rendering the legal integration of ESG into board-level obligations an urgent cross-jurisdictional challenge. Drawing on comparative statutory analysis and reflexive law theory, the paper extracts legislative techniques from Delawares Caremark doctrine, Germanys codified systematic oversight duty (AktG 91(2), 87(1)), and Japans low-threshold derivative enforcement regime to develop a transplantable framework for Chinas 2023 Company Law. The study finds that ESG is most effectively institutionalized when anchored in the duty of care rather than the duty of loyalty, operationalized through a board-level risk management safe harbor and reinforced by incentive-aligned remuneration and quantifiable, sector-specific benchmarks. The suggested one-sentence change to Article 180(2), along with a new governance code, changes sustainability from vague CSR promises into a fair and enforceable fiduciary standard. This makes long-term value creation and doctrinal clarity work together.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openaire https://doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/2026.bj30281first seen 2026-05-14 22:27:51
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