Designing Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for International Climate Cooperation: From the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement
国際気候協力のためのインセンティブ互換メカニズムの設計：京都議定書からパリ協定まで (AI 翻訳)
Zhenglan Tian
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、京都議定書とパリ協定を比較し、上意下達型と自主貢献型のインセンティブ効果を分析。フリーライダー問題、執行不足、短期主義の3つの課題を特定し、気候クラブ設立・国内法制化・世代間移転などの改革を提案する。国際交渉への制度的示唆を提供。
English
This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement to analyze incentive effects of top-down and bottom-up models. It identifies three core problems: free-riding, enforcement gaps, and short-termism. Proposed reforms include climate clubs with carbon pricing, domestic NDC legislation, and intergenerational financing. Provides operational institutional references for international climate negotiations.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本はパリ協定の締約国としてNDCの達成が課題。本論文が提唱する気候クラブや炭素国境調整メカニズムは、日本のカーボンプライシング議論や産業競争力に直結する示唆を含む。特に、排出量取引制度の設計やグリーンボンド活用の参考となる。
In the global GX context
This paper addresses foundational challenges in global climate cooperation, relevant to ISSB/TCFD frameworks indirectly through policy certainty. Its proposals on carbon clubs and border adjustments connect to ongoing debates in EU CBAM and US clean competition. Offers institutional design insights for strengthening Paris Agreement implementation.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:This paper provides a comparative institutional analysis of Kyoto and Paris mechanisms, useful for scholars studying climate policy design and international cooperation.
🏢実務担当者:The analysis reduces policy uncertainty for corporate low-carbon investments by outlining likely directions in international climate rules.
🏛政策担当者:The three reform proposals (climate club, enforcement, intergenerational financing) offer concrete options for negotiators and domestic legislation.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Climate change has left countries generally facing the dilemma of "hitchhiking" prisoners in emission-reduction cooperation. Taking the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement as cases, this article compares the incentive effect of the "top-down" compulsory model and the "bottom-up" independent contribution model, and finds three core problems: first, hitchhiking incentives always exist, and countries tend to set too low emission reduction targets; second, the absence of a credible enforcement system renders the cost of non‑compliance virtually zero; third, short-term economic benefits continue to overwhelm the long-term climate target. Accordingly, the paper proposes three policy reforms: First, to discourage free‑riding, the paper advocates establishing a climate club with a minimum carbon price and border carbon adjustments, supported by graduated sanctions. Second, to address enforcement gaps, it proposes domestic legislation of NDCs, automatic trigger mechanisms, and independent third‑party verification. Third, to counter short‑termism, it recommends rebalancing costs and benefits through intergenerational transfers, green bonds, and multilateral development bank financing linked to employment and energy security. The social value of this article lies in providing an operational institutional reference for international climate negotiations, and its commercial value lies in reducing the uncertainty around corporate policies and promoting the development of low-carbon industries.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/2026.34643first seen 2026-07-13 05:14:23
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