Dynamic game analysis of a dual-channel green supply chain considering supply disruption and carbon tax policy
Yuhao Zhang, Lin Huang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
炭素税政策のもとで、供給途絶リスクと小売業者のリスク回避行動を考慮したデュアルチャネルグリーンサプライチェーンの動的ゲームモデルを構築。ナッシュ均衡の安定性を分析し、調整パラメータの過度な速さや高い炭素税率、リスク回避度がシステムを不安定化することを発見。カオス状態では企業の利益が減少し、時間遅れフィードバック制御が有効であることを示した。
English
This study develops dynamic game models for a dual-channel green supply chain under carbon tax policy, considering supply disruption and retailer risk aversion. It finds that excessively fast adjustment parameters, high carbon tax rates, and high risk-aversion levels destabilize the Nash equilibrium, leading to chaos and profit losses. Time-delayed feedback control effectively mitigates chaos. The research offers insights for supply chain management and policy design.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
本論文は炭素税政策がサプライチェーンの安定性に与える影響を分析しており、日本の排出量取引制度やカーボンプライシング導入の議論に示唆を与える。特に、サプライチェーンの途絶リスクと企業のリスク回避行動を考慮した点は、日本企業の実務に参考となる。
In the global GX context
This paper provides a theoretical framework for understanding how carbon tax policy interacts with supply chain dynamics, relevant to global discussions on carbon pricing and supply chain resilience. The findings on stability conditions can inform policy design and corporate risk management strategies.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Offers a dynamic game-theoretic approach to analyze green supply chain stability under carbon tax and disruption risks.
🏢実務担当者:Provides guidance on managing supply chain stability and profitability under carbon tax and supply disruption scenarios.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights that high carbon tax rates may destabilize supply chains, useful for setting tax rates and designing support mechanisms.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Abstract This study investigates a dual-channel green supply chain (DCGSC) consisting of one manufacturer and one traditional retailer under a carbon tax policy. Considering the potential supply disruption risks faced by the supplier and the risk-averse risk aversion behavior of the retailer, a single-period Stackelberg game model is first developed, and its optimal equilibrium solution is derived. Subsequently, we establish the multi-period dynamic game models under the bounded rationality rule, and examine the existence and local asymptotic stability of the long-term equilibrium points. Furthermore, the complex dynamics of the multi-period game strategies and the performance of chain members are explored using chaos theory and numerical simulation. The results reveal that the Nash equilibrium point loses stability when the adjustment parameters of the manufacturer are excessively fast, leading to the emergence of bifurcation and chaos. A high risk-aversion degree of the retailer and a high carbon tax rate have a destabilizing effect on the system’s stability, while the influence of the supply disruption risks on the system stability depends on specific parameter conditions. Moreover, both the manufacturer and retailer suffer expected profit losses when the system enter a chaotic state. At last, the time-delayed feedback control method effectively eliminates chaotic behaviors in the DCGSC. The research findings provide valuable guidance for chain members and policymakers.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- crossref https://doi.org/10.1088/1674-1056/ae8389first seen 2026-06-30 05:55:18
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