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Energy performance contracting selection and carbon emission decisions under carbon cap‐and‐trade regulation

カーボンキャップアンドトレード規制下におけるエネルギー性能契約の選択と炭素排出意思決定 (AI 翻訳)

Ju Qiu, Zong-Hong Cao, Feng Yu, Jie Min, Jian Ou

International Transactions in Operational Research📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-05-20#炭素価格Origin: CN
DOI: 10.1111/itor.70210
原典: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70210

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

キャップアンドトレード規制下で、サプライチェーンにおけるエネルギー性能契約（EPC）の採用と炭素排出削減の意思決定を分析。サプライヤーがエネルギーサービス会社としてメーカーにEPCを提供するかどうかを検討し、製品代替率や直接販売コストが条件分岐に影響することを示した。EPC採用によりサプライチェーン全体の利益、消費者余剰、社会的厚生が改善されるパレート改善を確認。

English

This paper examines energy performance contracting (EPC) selection and carbon emission decisions in a supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation. A supplier can provide EPC to a manufacturer to enable low-carbon production. Results show that adoption depends on product substitution rate and direct sales cost, and EPC always improves total supply chain profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare, achieving Pareto improvement.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本ではキャップアンドトレード制度は全国規模ではないが、東京都や埼玉県などの地域制度や炭素税が存在する。本論文のサプライチェーン視点は、日本企業が排出権取引下でのエネルギー効率化投資を検討する際の参考となる。

In the global GX context

This paper contributes to the global understanding of how carbon pricing mechanisms like cap-and-trade influence operational decisions and collaboration in supply chains, particularly through energy performance contracting. The findings are relevant for designing effective emissions trading systems and promoting energy efficiency investments.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:The model offers a theoretical framework for studying supply chain coordination under carbon regulation, which can be extended to other policies or contexts.

🏢実務担当者:Supply chain managers can use the insights to evaluate when to adopt energy performance contracting under carbon pricing to improve profitability and sustainability.

🏛政策担当者:Regulators can consider how cap-and-trade design (e.g., allowance allocation) affects incentives for energy efficiency investments in supply chains.

📄 Abstract（原文）

Abstract Reducing carbon emissions has become a critical challenge under cap‐and‐trade regulation. Energy performance contracting (EPC) is a vital mechanism to address this challenge. Meanwhile, cap‐and‐trade regulation reshapes the profit distribution mechanism underlying EPC cooperation among supply chain members. This paper considers a specific supply chain structure. In this structure, a supplier sells products directly to consumers and also supplies raw materials to an SM. The manufacturer cannot produce low‐carbon products due to a lack of low‐carbon technologies. Against this background, this paper examines whether the supplier, acting as an energy service company, should provide EPC to the manufacturer to enable low‐carbon production. The results show that when the substitution rate of ordinary products for low‐carbon products is low, the supplier will adopt EPC only for itself if its direct sales channel cost is low. If the direct sales cost is high, the supplier will provide EPC only for the manufacturer. When both the product substitution rate and the direct sales cost are high, the supplier will offer EPC services to both itself and the manufacturer. Furthermore, this study verifies that EPC adoption can increase the total supply chain profit, improve consumer surplus, and enhance social welfare, thereby achieving Pareto improvement.

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