Carbon quota pledge or bank credit: which financing mode better drives emission abatement in remanufacturing?

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:This paper offers a rigorous game-theoretic model comparing financing modes with carbon emission reduction, useful for researchers in green supply chain finance.

🏢実務担当者:Remanufacturing firms facing capital constraints can learn about the potential benefits of carbon quota pledge financing under specific pledge rates and carbon prices.

🏛政策担当者:Policymakers can note that setting appropriate carbon quota pledge rates and higher carbon trading prices can promote complete remanufacturing and green finance.

Remanufacturing plays a vital role in sustainable manufacturing but is often hampered by significant capital requirements. Although traditional bank financing (BF) is commonly used, carbon quota pledge financing (CQPF) has emerged as a promising low-carbon alternative. However, whether and how CQPF outperforms BF in remanufacturing supply chain operations remains unclear. This study develops a Stackelberg game-theoretic model involving one capital-constrained manufacturer and one retailer. Four models are formulated to analyze equilibrium strategies under BF and CQPF, both with and without carbon emission reduction (CER). The effects of key parameters on pricing, environmental impact, and profitability are examined through analytical derivations and numerical simulations. Our analysis reveals three key findings. First, when the carbon quota pledge rate remains below a certain threshold, CQPF leads to lower wholesale and retail prices compared to BF, regardless of whether CER is implemented. Second, while implementing CER lowers product prices under both financing modes, it does not affect the supply chain’s decision to enter the remanufacturing market but raises the threshold for adopting complete remanufacturing. Third, CQPF consistently yields higher supply chain profits than BF; however, its effectiveness in enabling remanufacturing operations is subject to a specific threshold in the carbon trading price. These findings suggest that CQPF offers a viable and often superior financing alternative for capital-constrained remanufacturing firms, provided that the carbon quota pledge rate is appropriately set. For managers, prioritizing CQPF under low pledge rates enhances both market competitiveness and profitability. For policymakers, higher carbon trading prices can incentivize complete remanufacturing adoption. Banks should set pledge rates below the critical threshold to stimulate green manufacturing. The study also highlights that CER investment, while beneficial for demand, may increase overall environmental impact if it disproportionately expands new product production.

• openalex https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2026.1845058first seen 2026-07-08 05:15:27