Board Oversight Architecture and ESG Disclosure Quality: Complementarity and Substitution Between Audit and Sustainability Committees
取締役会の監督体制とESG開示の質：監査委員会とサステナビリティ委員会の補完性と代替性 (AI 翻訳)
Aso Abdullah, Khaoula Omhand, Aminul Islam
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
英国FTSE350企業を対象に、監査委員会とサステナビリティ委員会の構成がESG開示の質に与える影響を検証。パネルデータ分析の結果、各委員会属性は開示の質と正の関連を持つが、両委員会の相互作用により一部属性の効果が増幅または減衰することを示した。
English
This study examines how audit committee and sustainability committee characteristics affect ESG disclosure quality using a panel of UK FTSE350 firms. It finds positive associations but complementary/substitutive interactions between the two committees, suggesting board oversight design matters for disclosure outcomes.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではSSBJ基準の適用が始まり、取締役会のサステナビリティ監督体制が注目される。本論文は監査・サステナビリティ両委員会の役割分担設計に実践的示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
Global interest in board-level ESG oversight is growing, especially with ISSB and CSRD requirements. This paper provides empirical evidence on how audit and sustainability committees interact, informing governance best practices.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a nuanced understanding of board committee interaction effects on ESG disclosure, extending governance and disclosure literature.
🏢実務担当者:Offers insights on designing committee structures—whether to combine or separate audit and sustainability oversight for better disclosure.
🏛政策担当者:Suggests that governance codes and listing rules should consider complementarity between committees when mandating ESG oversight structures.
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study examines how board committee architecture is associated with ESG disclosure quality in UK listed firms. Using an unbalanced panel of FTSE 350 firms from 2010–2023 and LSEG ESG disclosure scores, we test whether audit committee (AC) monitoring capacity, proxied by independence, financial expertise, meeting frequency and committee size, relates to ESG disclosure quality, and whether these relationships are conditioned by the presence of a sustainability committee (SC). Panel regressions with industry and year fixed effects and firm‐level clustered standard errors show that each AC attribute is positively associated with ESG disclosure quality. SC presence is also positively associated with ESG disclosure quality, indicating that dedicated ESG governance structures are linked to more structured sustainability reporting. Interaction tests reveal heterogeneous conditioning effects: SC presence strengthens the associations for AC independence and meeting frequency but attenuates the associations for AC expertise and AC size. These findings show that board committees do not operate as uniformly additive governance mechanisms; rather, their contribution to ESG disclosure quality depends on how monitoring resources and ESG oversight responsibilities are configured across the board. The study contributes to the ESG governance literature by distinguishing complementary from substitutive relationships between audit and SCs. Robustness checks using pillar scores, firm fixed effects, lagged governance variables and alternative specifications yield consistent inferences.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.71173first seen 2026-06-26 05:34:01
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