Bank vs. Trade Credit Financing for Emission Reduction: The Role of Retailer Information Disclosure
排出削減のための銀行信用とトレードクレジット融資：小売業者の情報開示の役割 (AI 翻訳)
Jing Xia, Yifei Liu
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、資金制約のあるメーカーと需要情報を持つ小売業者からなるサプライチェーンを対象に、Stackelbergゲームモデルを構築し、メーカーの炭素削減融資戦略（銀行信用とトレードクレジット）と小売業者の情報共有意思決定の相互作用を分析した。結果、情報共有の効果は市場センチメントに依存し、楽観的な見通しでは投資促進に寄与するが、悲観的な場合は投資を抑制し排出を増加させる。また、メーカーの融資選択は投資コストと炭素価格に左右され、低コスト・高炭素価格時にはトレードクレジットが有利となる。さらに、予測精度の向上が常に情報共有を促進するとは限らず、閾値特性が存在する。
English
This paper constructs a Stackelberg game model for a supply chain with a capital-constrained manufacturer and a retailer with private demand information to analyze the interplay between the manufacturer's carbon abatement financing strategy (bank credit vs. trade credit) and the retailer's information sharing decision. Results show that information sharing is beneficial under optimistic forecasts but can suppress investment under pessimistic ones. The manufacturer's financing choice depends on investment cost and carbon price; trade credit becomes more attractive as costs decrease and carbon prices rise. Higher forecast accuracy does not always incentivize sharing, with distinct threshold effects.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では、カーボンプライシングの拡大やSSBJに基づくサプライチェーン排出量開示が進む中、本論文の知見は、資金制約のあるメーカーが排出削減投資を行う際の融資手段選択と情報開示のトレードオフを理解する上で示唆に富む。特に、炭素価格と投資コストの関係が日本企業の実務に直接的な影響を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to the global discussion on supply chain finance for emission reduction, particularly relevant under ISSB and SEC climate disclosure rules that require scope 1, 2, and 3 reporting. It highlights how carbon pricing and investment costs influence firms' financing choices and the role of information sharing in supply chain decarbonization, offering insights for policymakers designing carbon pricing mechanisms.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic framework for analyzing the interaction between financing and information sharing in emission reduction, valuable for further research on supply chain sustainability.
🏢実務担当者:Helps supply chain managers understand when to choose trade credit over bank credit for abatement investments and how retailer information sharing affects outcomes.
🏛政策担当者:Demonstrates that carbon prices and forecast accuracy have non-linear effects on disclosure incentives and abatement, informing the design of carbon pricing and disclosure regulations.
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study constructs a Stackelberg game model for a supply chain comprising a capital-constrained manufacturer and a retailer with private demand information to analyze the interplay between the manufacturer’s carbon abatement financing strategy (bank credit vs. trade credit) and the retailer’s information sharing decision. The results show that the impact of information sharing is contingent on market sentiment. Sharing is beneficial, promoting abatement investment and supply chain performance under optimistic market forecasts, but it can suppress investment and increase emissions under pessimistic ones. Furthermore, the manufacturer’s financing choice is driven by the investment cost and carbon price; trade credit becomes more attractive for emission reduction as investment costs decrease and carbon prices rise. Counter-intuitively, higher forecast accuracy does not always incentivize information sharing, with its effects on disclosure and environmental performance exhibiting distinct threshold characteristics.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/14/13/2292/pdf?version=1782633589first seen 2026-07-03 05:35:35
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