Technological Lock-in Due to Environmental Taxation
環境税による技術的ロックイン (AI 翻訳)
Mireille Chiroleu‐Assouline, Xavier Koch
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、環境税の事前コミットメントが企業の技術採用に与える影響を理論モデルで分析。不確実性下で、税率を固定することが革新的な技術への移行を阻害し、逆にロックインを引き起こす可能性を示す。また、競争が導入コストを高める一方、先発企業への支援が有効であることを指摘。
English
This paper theoretically analyzes how committed emission taxes affect the adoption of cleaner technologies under uncertainty. It shows that fixed carbon prices can lock firms into inferior technologies, especially when the regulator misestimates future technology prospects. Competition raises the cost of inducing a green transition, but targeted support for early adopters can help.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では炭素価格制度の本格導入が議論されており、本論文は政策の設計（特に税率の調整や支援策）に示唆を与える。SSBJ開示とも関連し、企業の排出削減戦略に影響。
In the global GX context
This paper offers critical insights for global carbon pricing design, highlighting the trade-off between commitment and flexibility. Relevant for ISSB and transition finance discussions, as it underscores the risk of policy lock-in and the need for complementary measures.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:A novel theoretical result on how carbon price commitment can backfire under technology uncertainty, with implications for optimal policy design.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights that stable carbon pricing may delay green investment if future technologies are uncertain; firms should factor in policy risk.
🏛政策担当者:Caution against rigid carbon price trajectories without adaptive mechanisms; consider support for early adopters to avoid lock-in.
📄 Abstract（原文）
We study how a committed emission tax shapes the adoption of successively cleaner technologies that arrive over time under uncertainty. Environmental policy increasingly relies on carbon prices that are set in advance and held fixed while such technologies emerge, and we show that this very commitment can lock firms into an inferior technology. In a two-period model, technologies differ only in their fixed adoption cost and emission rate; a regulator commits to a uniform tax and firms choose whether and when to adopt. Under monopoly with perfect foresight, the regulator can induce adoption of the cleanest technology but is sometimes better off not doing so, when its environmental gain falls short of the adoption cost. Under imperfect information the commitment cuts both ways: under-estimating the likelihood of the cleanest technology sets the tax too low, so the firm waits and stalls on its initial technology, whereas over-estimating it sets the tax so high that adoption is blocked altogether. The misperception distorts only the first-period adoption margin, over a benefit–cost band whose width scales with the size of the error. Competition sharpens the trade-off. With symmetric firms a strictly higher tax is needed to trigger adoption, so competition unambiguously raises the cost of inducing a green transition - even though the welfare ranking of monopoly and duopoly remains ambiguous. When one firm enjoys an adoption-cost advantage, it eases adoption for its rival and relaxes the regulator’s problem, pointing to a role for targeted first-adopter support alongside the tax.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://www.ifo.de/sites/default/files/docbase/docs/cesifo1_wp12807.pdffirst seen 2026-07-13 06:40:31
🔔 こうした論文の新着を逃したくない方は キーワードアラート に登録（無料・3キーワードまで）。
gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。