中国のデュアルカーボン目標下における低炭素農業機械普及のためのマルチステークホルダー進化ゲームと協調ガバナンスメカニズム

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:Provides a replicable evolutionary game framework for analyzing multi-stakeholder low-carbon technology diffusion with carbon pricing.

🏢実務担当者:Highlights how carbon costs and subsidies affect agricultural machinery supply chains and farmer adoption, useful for transition risk assessment.

🏛政策担当者:Suggests balanced carbon tax, penalty, and subsidy design to promote low-carbon machinery without overburdening stakeholders.

Introduction Under China's dual-carbon goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality and the broader agenda of agricultural pollution control, the promotion of low-carbon agricultural machinery requires stable coordination among the government, agricultural machinery enterprises, and professional large-scale farmers. Methods Taking Heilongjiang Province as the research context, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving these three stakeholders to examine their strategic choices, evolutionary stability conditions, and the effects of key parameters on system dynamics. Model parameters are determined using statistical yearbooks, enterprise information platforms, field interviews, and expert consultations, and numerical simulations are conducted in MATLAB. Results The results show that the system can evolve toward an ideal stable state characterized by active regulation, low-carbon supply, and purchase adoption. However, the convergence speed and stability of this state are jointly affected by policy incentives, carbon-pricing constraints, penalty intensity, transition costs, and market returns. Under the carbon-tax policy scenario designed in this study, moderately increasing the carbon-emission costs borne by high-carbon agricultural machinery producers, strengthening penalties for non-compliant production, and providing reasonable purchase subsidies for professional large-scale farmers can enhance enterprises' willingness to supply low-carbon machinery and farmers' willingness to adopt it. Conversely, excessive government regulatory costs, enterprise transition costs, and farmers' purchase costs hinder the system's evolution toward the ideal stable state. Discussion The findings suggest that low-carbon agricultural machinery promotion depends on a balanced combination of policy incentives, carbon-pricing constraints, penalty regulation, cost sharing, and market-based returns. Such coordination can expand the supply and application of low-carbon agricultural machinery, reduce carbon emissions and environmental pollution associated with agricultural machinery operations, and generates potential environmental health co-benefits. This study provides theoretical support and decision-making references for the low-carbon transition of agricultural machinery and the source control of agricultural production pollution.

• openalex https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2026.1891382first seen 2026-11-05 05:07:49 · last seen 2026-11-06 04:49:52