Shipping transition under green energy supply risks: three-dimensional mechanism analysis
グリーンエネルギー供給リスク下での船舶転換：三次元的メカニズム分析 (AI 翻訳)
Jiayu Liu, Jun Ye, J Chen, PanJian Yi
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
この研究は、炭素税政策、グリーンエネルギー供給の不確実性、市場競争の強度を考慮した港湾・海運サプライチェーンのゲームモデルを開発。安定的なグリーンエネルギー供給が海運企業の転換インセンティブを高める一方、激しい市場競争は抑制的に働くことを示す。適切な炭素税水準がグリーン投資を促進し、港湾・海運の協調メカニズムが対称的転換を実現することを明らかにした。
English
This study develops a game model of port-shipping supply chain with carbon taxation, green energy supply uncertainty, and market competition. It finds that stable green energy supply boosts shipping companies' transition incentives, while intense competition suppresses collaboration. An appropriate carbon tax level can restore incentives, and a port-shipping collaborative mechanism enables a symmetric green transition, providing theoretical support for maritime carbon tax policy design.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本の海運業界では、国際海運の脱炭素化が急務であり、IMOの規制対応が進む中、本モデルは炭素税とグリーン投資の関係を理論的に示す。日本の港湾政策や海運企業の戦略立案に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
Global shipping faces decarbonization pressure under IMO and national carbon tax proposals. This model offers insights into how carbon tax design and green energy supply stability can drive transition, relevant for policymakers and supply chain stakeholders.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic framework to analyze shipping green transition under carbon tax and supply risks.
🏢実務担当者:Port and shipping companies can use the findings to design collaborative investment strategies and anticipate competition effects.
🏛政策担当者:Offers theoretical support for setting carbon tax levels to avoid asymmetric transition and achieve triple-win outcomes.
📄 Abstract（原文）
With the gradual implementation of shipping carbon dioxide tax policies, green energy transition has become essential for low-carbon coordination in the port–shipping supply chain. This study develops a ‘1v2’ port–shipping supply chain game model incorporating carbon taxation, green energy supply uncertainty and market competition intensity. The model comprises one oligopolistic port and two perfectly competitive shipping companies, examining green investment decisions from integrated policy, resource and market perspectives. Results demonstrate that a stable green energy supply significantly enhances shipping companies’ transition incentives, whereas intensified market competition induces conservative behaviours and suppresses collaborative green investment. An appropriately designed carbon dioxide tax level can restore green investment incentives and alleviate transition constraints. Further analysis reveals that shipping companies’ heterogeneity amplifies competition, thereby reducing social welfare when all shipping companies undertake green transition. Moderate adjustment of the carbon dioxide tax interval shifts equilibrium from asymmetric to symmetric green transition, enabling a ‘triple-win’ outcome. Moreover, a port–shipping collaborative green investment mechanism eliminates asymmetric equilibria and enlarges the equilibrium region of symmetric green transition. Overall, this study provides theoretical support for maritime carbon dioxide tax policy design and a decision-making framework for coordinated emission reduction and sustainable development in port–shipping supply chains.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1680/jmaen.25.01917first seen 2026-06-12 05:25:29
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