土壌炭素クレジットは農業における気候正義を満たさない
Soil carbon credits fail climate justice in agriculture (原題)
Gabriel Y.K. Moinet
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
著者は楽観的な市場アクセス・隔離率の仮定の下でも、土壌炭素クレジットによる農家収入が国内・国際間で極めて不平等に分配されると示す。恩恵の大きい農家は歴史的排出責任と富裕度の高い国の大規模農家に偏り、小規模農家は低所得国に集中する。MRV改善や小規模農家の集約では土地分配の不平等は解消せず、土地所有・tenureに直接向き合う必要があると論じる。
English
Using optimistic assumptions on market access and sequestration rates, the author shows that potential farm revenues from soil carbon credits are distributed highly unequally within and across countries, mirroring the concentration of farmland among large farms. The biggest beneficiaries sit disproportionately in wealthier countries with greater historical emissions, while smallholders with the least revenue potential cluster in lower-income countries. Improving MRV or aggregating smallholders does not change land distribution; addressing inequity requires confronting land tenure directly.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
J-クレジットや農業由来カーボンクレジットの拡大を検討する日本にとって、分配衡平性と土地所有の論点は制度設計上の重要な警告となる。SSBJ・Scope3開示で農業サプライチェーンの脱炭素調達を進める企業にも示唆がある。
In the global GX context
Speaks directly to the integrity debate around voluntary carbon markets (ICVCM, Article 6) and to ISSB/CSRD supply-chain disclosure, warning that crediting design alone cannot deliver just transition outcomes without addressing land tenure.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:炭素クレジット市場の分配効果と気候正義の交差点を定量化する分析枠組みとして参照できる。
🏢実務担当者:農業サプライチェーンでオフセット調達を検討する際、分配リスクと評判リスクを制度設計に織り込む必要性を示す。
🏛政策担当者:土壌炭素クレジット制度を設計する際、土地所有・tenure改革と分配衡平性の観点を組み込むべき根拠となる。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Soil carbon has emerged as a focus of global climate and sustainability debates, with growing attention to the potential role of voluntary soil carbon markets in financing more sustainable farming. Yet there is little understanding of who would benefit from such markets, and therefore of whether they can contribute to just and equitable sustainable development and climate action. Here, using optimistic assumptions about market access and sequestration rates, I show that potential farm revenues from soil carbon credits are distributed highly unequally, both within and across countries, reflecting the concentration of farmland among a small number of large farms. As a result, farms benefiting most are disproportionately located in countries with greater historical responsibility for emissions and greater wealth, while smallholders who have the least potential revenues are disproportionately distributed in lower-income countries. Under per-hectare carbon crediting, the promise that voluntary soil carbon markets could finance more sustainable farming, particularly in low-income countries, is therefore constrained by the distribution of farmland. Recent studies remain optimistic that redesign of measurement, reporting and verification systems can reduce the overall cost and uncertainty associated to the voluntary carbon market, and that aggregating smallholders into larger projects can reduce the cost of participating. Neither, however, changes how land is distributed. I contend that addressing this inequity would require confronting land distribution and tenure directly. Without this, soil carbon crediting is likely to reproduce land inequality and to fall short of the transformation it is often promised to support.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1177/00307270261503126first seen 2026-11-01 04:58:02 · last seen 2026-11-06 04:55:01
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