Operations of a Cross-Border Remanufacturing Supply Chain Under Carbon Tariffs and Cap-and-Trade Regulation
炭素関税と排出権取引規制下における越境リマニュファクチャリングサプライチェーンの運用 (AI 翻訳)
Xuemei Zhang, Haodong Chen, Guohu Qi
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
炭素関税と排出権取引（キャップ・アンド・トレード）が越境リマニュファクチャリングサプライチェーンに与える影響を、スタッケルベルグゲームを用いて分析。4つのシナリオ（規制なし、炭素関税のみ、排出権取引のみ、両方）で均衡価格・生産量・炭素削減量を導出。炭素関税は排出削減に有効だが企業利益と厚生を低下させ、排出権取引がそれを緩和することを示した。ただし簡略化した分析枠組みでの結果である。
English
This paper examines a cross-border remanufacturing supply chain under carbon tariffs and cap-and-trade using a two-stage Stackelberg game. It finds that carbon tariffs reduce emissions but hurt profits and social welfare, while cap-and-trade mitigates these adverse effects. Dual regulation can improve profitability and environmental quality under certain conditions. The study offers operational insights for firms and policy implications for cross-border carbon regulation.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
本論文は炭素国境調整メカニズム（CBAM）と国内排出権取引の相互作用を考察しており、日本企業がEUなどへの輸出を考慮する際の参考になる。ただし中国を前提としたモデルであり、日本の制度設計とは異なる点に注意。
In the global GX context
This paper provides analytical insights into how carbon tariffs and cap-and-trade interact in a cross-border supply chain, relevant to the EU's CBAM and global carbon pricing trends. It highlights the potential for dual regulation to achieve both environmental and economic goals, offering policy design implications for governments.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Useful for researchers interested in carbon regulation and supply chain game theory.
🏢実務担当者:Remanufacturing firms can understand the trade-offs between carbon tariffs and cap-and-trade in cross-border operations.
🏛政策担当者:Offers insights into designing complementary carbon policies across borders.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Cross-border remanufacturing trade is developing steadily. Carbon tariffs and carbon cap-and-trade regulation have emerged as two important instruments for carbon governance, yet their independent and combined effects on supply chain operations remain insufficiently discussed, which delivers supplementary analytical space for cross-border remanufacturing supply chain research. This paper examines a cross-border supply chain consisting of an exporting manufacturer and an importing retailer that distributes both new and remanufactured products. Four research scenarios are established: no regulation, carbon tariffs only, cap-and-trade only, and dual mixed regulation. Adopting a two-stage Stackelberg game, we analyze equilibrium pricing, production, and carbon abatement decisions, and further evaluate environmental performance and overall social welfare. Firms with different initial carbon emission levels respond differently to regulatory stringency. The results show that carbon tariffs reduce total emissions but erode corporate profits and social welfare, while cap-and-trade regulation can mitigate such adverse effects. When carbon tariffs are stringent and carbon quotas are sufficient, dual regulation improves all participants’ profitability alongside better environmental quality and higher consumer surplus only within this paper’s simplified analytical context. This study offers tentative operational references for remanufacturing firms and theoretical and analytical implications for governments to design compatible cross-border carbon regulatory systems.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/su18147421first seen 2026-07-22 04:56:21
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