The Complexity of Dynamic Pricing in the Logistics‐Shared Electric Vehicle Market Under the Circumstances of Operator Platform Game Cooperation and Total Carbon Emission Control and Its Application
物流共有電気自動車市場における動的価格設定の複雑性：プラットフォームゲーム協力と総炭素排出制御の下での応用 (AI 翻訳)
Junhai Ma, Meng Qi, Liyan Geng
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、既存および新規参入の物流共有電気自動車（LSEV）事業者間の競争と協力を分析し、炭素排出削減技術や炭素取引価格が利益や価格動態に与える影響を非線形動的システムモデルで解明した。過度な価格調整はカオスを生むが、遅延制御により安定化できることを示した。
English
This study develops supply chain models for incumbent and entrant logistics shared electric vehicle (LSEV) operators, analyzing how platform cooperation, carbon emission reduction technology, and carbon trading prices affect optimal pricing and profitability using a nonlinear dynamical system. It finds that aggressive price adjustments can lead to chaos, but delay control restores stability.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本の物流業界ではEV導入やカーボンプライシングが進む中、プラットフォーム協力と価格戦略の知見は、特にラストマイル配送の効率化と脱炭素化に示唆を与える。ただし中国市場を想定したモデルであり、適用には調整が必要。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to global literature on shared electric vehicle operations under carbon constraints, relevant for cities and logistics firms adopting EVs and carbon trading. The findings on price dynamics and stability are applicable to platform-based mobility markets worldwide.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a rigorous model linking carbon emission reduction technology, carbon trading, and platform competition in LSEV markets.
🏢実務担当者:Offers strategic insights on pricing and cooperation with promotion platforms under carbon emission limits.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights how carbon quota levels and trading prices can alleviate cost burdens, guiding carbon market design.
📄 Abstract（原文）
ABSTRACT Disruptions triggered by events such as COVID‐19 have revealed the scarcity of logistics resources. Logistics shared electric vehicles (LSEVs) enhance emergency flexibility, yet competition and sustainability between incumbent and entrant LSEV operators remain underexplored. This study develops supply chain models with an incumbent and an entrant LSEV operator to systematically examine how market factors affect strategic cooperation with a promotion platform, optimal rental prices, and profitability. We further employ a complex nonlinear dynamical system Markov framework to characterize how the magnitude of price adjustment influences system stability. The results show that (1) when the platform's promotion level or its efficiency coefficient is low, or when the promotion fee rate or crowding‐out coefficient is high, platform cooperation induces destructive price competition; (2) as the level of carbon emission reduction technology increases, LSEV profits exhibit an inverted‐U pattern. Under high service homogeneity and a low carbon trading price, operators without carbon emission reduction technology upgrades may engage in free‐riding; (3) increasing the failure rate of either operator's vehicle triggers a downward price spiral for both parties; (4) the combination of higher carbon‐quota levels and their trading prices alleviate the cost burden of carbon emission reduction upgrades; and (5) overly aggressive price adjustment by either party can generate chaotic price dynamics and reduce long‐run expected profits, whereas introducing a delay‐control method effectively restores system stability.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70134first seen 2026-07-19 05:14:52
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