安価な約束：企業の気候コミットメントはなぜ失敗するのか、グリーンボンドは役立つのか

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

🔬研究者:SBTiデータを用いたコミットメント撤回の実証と理論モデルを組み合わせた分析枠組みを提供する。

🏢実務担当者:SBTi目標の設定・維持における検証厳格さと失敗コストのバランスを経営判断に活かせる。

🏛政策担当者:検証基準と失敗ペナルティの設計が企業コミットの信頼性に与える影響を政策設計に反映できる。

Firms frequently announce public commitments to reduce carbon emissions but often fail to follow through on them. This paper studies why these commitments break down and whether financial instruments can make them more credible. I develop an incomplete-information model in which firms differ in their ability to reduce emissions and complete third-party verification. Because firms can withdraw from a commitment by accepting a reputational or financial penalty, even firms with low abatement ability may choose to commit initially when the cost of failure is limited. The model shows that the equilibrium removal rate equals c/(R+P), where c represents the strictness of the verification standard, while R and P represent the reputational and financial penalties associated with withdrawal. This implies that stricter verification requirements raise the removal rate, while stronger penalties for failure lower it. I test this prediction using data from the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi), which covers 15,304 firms, focusing on the 6,613 firms whose commitment status has been resolved. Using a linear probability model, I find that publicly listed firms are 13.7 percentage points less likely than unlisted firms to have their commitments removed. This difference is substantial relative to the overall removal rate of 21.1 percent. Although this estimate should not be interpreted as causal, it is consistent with the model’s prediction that stronger consequences for failure increase the credibility of corporate climate commitments.

• semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.63313/epp.9056first seen 2026-10-27 05:13:56 · last seen 2026-11-06 05:14:35