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政策介入と統合価格メカニズム下における港湾の低炭素「鉄道・海運直送」モードの戦略：三者進化ゲームとシミュレーション分析

Strategies for the low-carbon ‘direct rail-sea transshipment’ mode in ports under policy intervention and integrated pricing mechanisms: a three-party evolutionary game and simulation analysis (原題)

Jiahao Zhao, Wenzhi Yue, Xinghua Hu, Ruizi Cheng, Ronghua Yu, Tao Li

Maritime Policy & Management📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-09-11#政策Origin: CN経営インパクト: コスト削減対象セクター: transport
DOI: 10.1080/03088839.2026.2727588
原典: https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2026.2727588

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

港湾の鉄道・海運直送輸送を対象に、政府・港湾・複合輸送事業者の三者進化ゲームモデルを構築し、ヤード料金率を内生変数として均衡の安定条件を導出した。ヤード料金率が閾値を下回ると炭素税と補助金が無効化し理想均衡に収束しない一方、閾値超では進化速度が加速する。炭素税・補助金・ヤード料金の相乗的組み合わせが単独・二重の政策を大きく上回ることを示す。

English

This paper builds a three-party evolutionary game model (government, ports, intermodal operators) for low-carbon direct rail-sea transshipment, treating the yard fee rate as endogenous. Below a critical yard fee threshold, carbon taxes and subsidies become ineffective and the system fails to reach the ideal equilibrium; above it, convergence accelerates. A synergistic mix of yard fees, carbon taxes, and subsidies markedly outperforms single or paired instruments in emission reduction and net government benefit.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

中国の港湾物流を対象とした理論研究だが、炭素税・補助金・料金設計の相互作用を分析する枠組みは、日本の港湾脱炭素化やカーボンプライシング設計、SSBJ開示におけるScope 3物流排出の議論にも示唆を与える。

In the global GX context

While focused on Chinese port logistics, the paper's analysis of how carbon taxes, subsidies, and pricing interact offers transferable insights for global port decarbonization and carbon-pricing design, relevant to Scope 3 logistics emissions under ISSB/CSRD disclosure frameworks.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:港湾・物流の脱炭素政策を進化ゲームで分析する手法と、政策手段の相乗効果の条件を学べる。

🏢実務担当者:港湾・物流事業者は、ヤード料金や炭素税が直送モード採用の経済性に与える影響を理解し、投資判断に活用できる。

🏛政策担当者:単一の炭素税や補助金ではなく、料金・税・補助金を組み合わせた多次元政策設計の必要性を示唆する。

📄 Abstract（原文）

Rail-Sea Direct Transport at ports can significantly enhance intermodal efficiency and reduce carbon emissions by minimizing transshipment at storage yards. To address coordination challenges among government, ports, and intermodal operators, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model treating the yard fee rate as an endogenous variable. Through replicator dynamic equations and Jacobian matrix eigenvalue analysis, stability conditions for equilibrium are derived, and the driving effects of key parameters are simulated. Results show that when the yard fee rate falls below a critical threshold, carbon taxes and subsidies become entirely ineffective, and the system cannot converge to the ideal equilibrium. Once the rate exceeds this threshold, the evolutionary speeds of both ports and intermodal operators accelerate as the rate rises. Raising the carbon tax coefficient does not alter the system’s ultimate evolutionary direction but differentially accelerates convergence across agents, with the strongest effect on intermodal operators. Excessive subsidies, conversely, weaken governmental regulatory incentives while suppressing the other two parties. A synergistic combination of yard fees, carbon taxes, and subsidies markedly outperforms any single or paired instrument in evolutionary speed, net government benefits, and emission reduction. Policymakers should therefore establish a multidimensional, coordinated policy system rather than a single tool.

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