ベトナム製造企業の炭素クレジット市場参加意欲の評価：質的研究とゲーム理論の応用
Assessing the Willingness of Manufacturing Enterprises in Vietnam to Participate in the Carbon Credit Market: A Qualitative Study and Game Theory Application (原題)
Le Thi Hue
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
ベトナム製造企業18社への深層インタビューとゲーム理論モデルを組み合わせ、炭素クレジット市場への参加意欲を分析。政策の曖昧さと投資コスト負担が主要障壁となり、「様子見」が支配的で、現状では「遅延」が唯一のナッシュ均衡となる「不作為の罠」を定量化。透明な市場ロードマップ、明確な炭素価格、実質的な資金・技術支援が均衡打破に不可欠と結論づける。
English
Combining 18 in-depth interviews with Vietnamese manufacturers and a game-theory model, this study assesses willingness to join the carbon credit market. Policy ambiguity and investment costs drive a 'wait-and-see' stance, with 'Delay' as the sole Nash Equilibrium—an 'inaction trap.' It concludes that transparent roadmaps, clear carbon pricing, and financial/technical support are needed to break the equilibrium.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本企業にとっては、ベトナムを含むアジア新興国での炭素市場整備の遅れがサプライチェーン上のScope 3対応や投資判断に影響する点が示唆的。JCM（二国間クレジット制度）や日系製造業の海外拠点戦略を考える上で、現地企業のインセンティブ構造を理解する材料となる。
In the global GX context
For global readers, this paper illustrates how policy uncertainty and cost burdens create an 'inaction trap' in emerging carbon markets, relevant to Article 6 implementation and supply-chain decarbonization. It offers a transferable game-theory framework for analyzing corporate behavior under nascent carbon pricing regimes beyond Vietnam.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:新興国における企業の炭素市場参加行動をゲーム理論でモデル化する手法と、質的調査との混合研究デザインの応用例として参考になる。
🏢実務担当者:ベトナム拠点を持つ企業は、現地サプライヤーの炭素クレジット参加意欲の低さと政策リスクを踏まえ、Scope 3削減やオフセット調達の計画に注意が必要。
🏛政策担当者:炭素市場の透明なロードマップと炭素価格の明確化、投資支援が企業の不作為を解消する鍵となることを示唆。
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study aims to assess the willingness of manufacturing enterprises in Vietnam to participate in the carbon credit market and to analyze the strategic interactions that shape their decisions in an emerging market context. Applying an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design, the research begins with a qualitative phase involving 18 in-depth interviews with senior managers, then uses these findings to construct and analyze a Game Theory model. The results show that policy ambiguity and the burden of investment costs are the two main barriers, leading to a prevalent "wait-and-see" mentality. The Game Theory model quantifies this, demonstrating that under the current circumstances, "Delay" is the sole Nash Equilibrium, creating an "inaction trap" where individually rational actions by firms collectively lead to market-wide stagnation. Consequently, the study affirms that policy interventions are crucial to break this equilibrium. Key policy implications include the need for the Government to quickly provide a transparent market roadmap, establish clear carbon pricing mechanisms, and implement substantive financial and technical support packages to reduce investment costs and increase the opportunity cost of inaction. The novelty of this research lies in its combination of the depth of qualitative analysis with the systematic logic of Game Theory, providing a multidimensional and insightful perspective on corporate strategic behavior in an emerging market, thereby not only filling a research gap in Vietnam but also offering a useful analytical framework for policymakers.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.56201/ijebm.vol.11.no11.2025.pg124.133first seen 2026-09-11 05:04:55
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