Data and Code for: Energy Transitions in Regulated Markets
規制市場におけるエネルギー移行：データとコード (AI 翻訳)
Gautam Gowrisankaran, Ashley Langer, Mar Reguant
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、米国の規制市場において、電力会社が石炭から天然ガスへの移行を遅らせる理由を構造モデルで分析。炭素税導入時、規制下の電力会社は短期的な石炭発電削減がコスト最小化企業の48%にとどまり、30年後にはコスト最小化企業が規制下より71%多く石炭容量を廃止することを示す。規制の設計が移行期の信頼性や affordability に影響を与える可能性を指摘。
English
This paper develops a structural model of rate-of-return regulation to explain why regulated U.S. utilities retire coal more slowly during the transition from coal to natural gas. Under a carbon tax, a regulated utility reduces short-run coal generation only 48% as much as a cost-minimizer. After 30 years, a cost-minimizer retires 71% more coal capacity. The findings highlight trade-offs between cost savings, reliability, and affordability under regulation.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本でも電力業界は規制料金下にあり、石炭火力のフェードアウト政策（例：2030年時点で石炭火力発電比率19%）と整合する知見。本論文の「規制下での炭素税効果の減殺」モデルは、日本の容量市場や発電部門の脱炭素政策設計に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
The paper provides a structural framework applicable to regulated electricity markets globally, including those with rate-of-return regulation. It demonstrates how traditional regulation can blunt carbon pricing signals, informing policy debates on utility decarbonization, especially in states considering carbon taxes or clean energy standards.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:A structural model of utility behavior under regulation during energy transitions, with empirical validation from U.S. data.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights how current regulatory structures may delay coal retirement and reduce carbon tax effectiveness, relevant for utility planning and regulatory strategy.
🏛政策担当者:Provides evidence that rate-of-return regulation weakens carbon pricing, suggesting complementary policies for timely coal phase-out.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Natural gas has replaced coal as the dominant fuel for U.S. electricity generation. However, utilities in regulated U.S. states have retired coal more slowly than others. We build a structural model of rate-of-return regulation during an energy transition where utilities face tradeoffs between lowering costs and maintaining and using legacy capacity. A regulated utility facing carbon taxes lowers short-run coal generation 48% as much as a cost minimizer would. Thirty years after a sudden energy transition, a cost minimizer has retired 71% more coal capacity than the regulated utility. Alternative regulations may jeopardize affordability and reliability goals during energy transitions.<br>
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3886/e240509v1first seen 2026-07-21 04:51:41
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