Co-opetition strategies of prefabricated building manufacturers and remanufacturers under conditions of emissions cap and trade: a game-theory modeling approach
排出上限・排出権取引下におけるプレハブ建築メーカーと再製造業者の協調・競争戦略：ゲーム理論モデリングアプローチ (AI 翻訳)
Wen Jiang, Menglin Liu, Lin Zhang, Igor Martek
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、排出上限と排出権取引の規制下で、プレハブ建築メーカー（PBM）と再製造業者（PBR）の生産・排出削減戦略をゲーム理論で分析。コスト分担とライセンス契約のモデルを構築し、再製造のコスト削減が中程度で排出削減コストが低い場合、競争がPBMの排出削減を促進することを示した。高い炭素価格ではコスト分担戦略が環境と利益に有効だが、ライセンス戦略はPBRの利益を減少させる。
English
This paper develops a game-theoretic model to analyze production and emission reduction strategies for prefabricated building manufacturers (PBMs) and remanufacturers (PBRs) under emissions cap-and-trade regulations. It introduces cost-sharing and licensing models, finding that stronger competition can induce PBMs to reduce emissions when remanufacturing cost savings are moderate and emission reduction costs are low. A cost-sharing strategy benefits both environment and profits when carbon prices are high, while licensing reduces PBR's profit.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では建設分野の脱炭素化が進む中、排出権取引制度の導入検討が進んでいる。本モデルは、プレハブ建築における競合と協調の戦略を提示し、日本の建設業界におけるカーボンプライシング政策への示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
As cap-and-trade systems expand globally, this paper offers insights into how emission reduction investments interact with competition and cooperation in the construction sector. The findings are relevant for policymakers designing carbon pricing mechanisms and for firms in emission-intensive industries.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic framework for analyzing co-opetition under carbon pricing, relevant for industrial organization and environmental economics.
🏢実務担当者:Offers strategic guidance for prefabricated building firms on whether to adopt cost-sharing or licensing under different carbon price scenarios.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights how carbon pricing design (cap stringency, trading price) influences firm behavior and the potential for win-win cooperative strategies.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Prefabricated building manufacturers (PBMs) are compelled to invest in emission reduction practices to satisfy carbon emission restriction regulations. Emission regimes utilize two main systems, being “carbon emissions caps” (cap) and “carbon emissions trading” (trade). This paper aims to provide the production and emission reduction strategies for PBM to deal with challenges of the “cap” and “trade” regulations and remanufacturing competition. This paper develops a game model comprised of a PBM and a competitive prefabricated building remanufacturer (PBR) engaged dynamically under conditions of “cap” and “trade”. Additionally, it constructs cost-sharing and licensing models for cooperation. Considering the constraints of new components’ production on the remanufacturing output, this paper employs Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions and game theory to identify optimal solutions. The results show that when cost savings for remanufacturing are moderate and the cost of emissions reduction is sufficiently low, stronger competition can induce PBM to reduce emissions further. Adopting a cost-sharing strategy is not only beneficial for the environment but can also result in increased profits for both PBM and PBR, when the carbon trading price is sufficiently high. A licensing strategy can also help PBM to reduce emissions and counter the competition of PBR, but it decreases PBR's profit. This paper focuses on examining emissions reduction investment as well as identifying which strategies prove more beneficial for PBM and PBR in a competitive remanufacturing system.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1108/ecam-05-2024-0552first seen 2026-05-15 17:05:30
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