完全情報・不完全情報下における最適CCUS補助金
Optimal CCUS Subsidies with perfect and imperfect information (原題)
UT Austin, Connor Colombe
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
政府計画者とCO2排出企業のStackelbergゲームを用い、CCUS補助金水準が排出量・企業利益・社会厚生に与える影響を分析。企業のCCUS投資を誘導することが最適となる条件と、CCUS導入によりかえって排出が増え得る条件を解析的に導出する。さらに投資コストの不確実性を不完備情報ゲームとして組み込み、最適補助金と排出への影響を検討し、火力発電所のケースに適用して政策提言を行う。
English
Using a Stackelberg game between a government planner and a CO2-emitting firm, the paper analyzes how CCUS subsidy levels affect emissions, firm profit, and social welfare. It analytically derives optimal subsidy levels and conditions under which inducing CCUS investment is optimal—or where adoption could perversely raise emissions. It extends the model with uncertain investment costs as a game of incomplete information and applies findings to a thermal power plant case with policy recommendations.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本はGX推進戦略でCCUSを重点技術に位置づけ、補助金・支援策の設計が政策課題となっている。本論文の最適補助金設計と排出増リスクの分析は、国内CCUS支援制度の妥当性検討に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
As governments worldwide deploy CCUS subsidies under net-zero pathways, this work informs how subsidy design interacts with disclosure of transition plans and public financing. It offers a rigorous framework for evaluating whether CCUS support genuinely reduces emissions or risks perverse outcomes.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:CCUS補助金の理論的最適水準と不完備情報下の影響を定量枠組みで理解できる。
🏢実務担当者:CCUS投資判断や政府補助金活用の際、補助水準と収益性・排出への影響を評価する視点を提供。
🏛政策担当者:CCUS補助金設計が排出増を招く条件を踏まえ、支援策の条件設定や不確実性対応を検討すべき。
📄 Abstract（原文）
Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) has been widely recognized for its role in many decarbonization pathways. Emerging technologies like CCUS are often adopted slowly until the technology matures and the implementation costs fall enough for firms to profit. Government planners can induce earlier adoption of new technologies through direct and indirect subsidies. In this paper, we use a stylized Stackelberg game framework involving a government planner and CO2-emitting firm to study the impacts of different subsidy levels on CO2 emissions, firm profit, and social welfare. We analytically derive optimal CCUS subsidy levels under a variety of assumptions and study the conditions under which it is optimal to induce the firm to invest in CO2 capture, and under which emissions could actually increase due to CCUS adoption. We extend our model further by adding uncertainty in the firm’s CCUS investment costs, which leads to a game of incomplete information from the government’s perspective. From this we study the effects of uncertainty on the optimal subsidy level and CO2 emissions. We also apply our findings to a case study of a thermal power plant and make policy recommendations based on the outcome.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.21872/annual2025_6198first seen 2026-10-19 04:58:04
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