3PL主導の低炭素サプライチェーンの複雑性への対応：情報非対称性下での持続可能性とレジリエンスのための二段階動的調整メカニズム
Navigating Complexity of 3PL-Led Low-Carbon Supply Chains: A Two-Stage Dynamic Coordination Mechanism for Sustainability and Resilience Under Information Asymmetry (原題)
Jinde Jiang, Junding Yang, W Liu, Yingjing Gu, Jing Gu, Yiling Zhu
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、3PL主導の低炭素サプライチェーンにおける情報非対称性が協調効率を損なう問題に対し、Stackelberg動学ゲームモデルを構築。政府の炭素排出上限政策と消費者の低炭素選好を考慮し、集中型協調が炭素削減と利益の両方を向上させることを示す。さらに、交渉力加重利益配分契約とブロックチェーン炭素データ共有に基づくNash交渉を組み合わせた二段階動的調整メカニズムを提案し、数値実験で有効性を検証している。
English
This paper addresses information asymmetry in 3PL-led low-carbon supply chains using a Stackelberg dynamic game model. It shows centralized coordination improves both carbon reduction and profits under carbon cap policy and consumer low-carbon preferences. A two-stage coordination mechanism combining bargaining-power-weighted profit sharing and blockchain-based Nash bargaining is proposed and validated numerically.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では、サプライチェーン排出量の算定・開示がSSBJ基準で求められており、3PLを含む物流分野の低炭素化は重要課題。本モデルは情報共有と協調メカニズムの設計に示唆を与え、荷主と物流事業者の連携強化に貢献する。
In the global GX context
Globally, supply chain decarbonization is central to Scope 3 disclosure under ISSB and CSRD. This paper offers a game-theoretic framework for coordinating low-carbon efforts in logistics, relevant for practitioners facing information asymmetry and blockchain-based data sharing.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a dynamic coordination model for low-carbon supply chains under information asymmetry, useful for extending to other sectors.
🏢実務担当者:Offers practical contract and data-sharing mechanisms to enhance supply chain sustainability and resilience.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights the role of carbon cap policies in incentivizing supply chain coordination, informing policy design.
📄 Abstract（原文）
To address the issue where information asymmetry in third-party logistics (3PL)-led low-carbon supply chain coordination undermines coordination efficiency, thereby threatening the sustainability and resilience of supply chain cooperation, this paper develops a Stackelberg dynamic game model with the 3PL as the leader. This model is constructed within the context where consumers’ low-carbon preferences influence product demand, and a government carbon cap policy is implemented. By comparing decentralized and centralized equilibria, we verify that centralized collaboration achieves dual gains: higher carbon reduction levels and greater overall supply chain profits, which strengthens sustainability and resilience. To address efficiency losses from three types of information asymmetry, we propose a two-stage dynamic coordination mechanism adapted to evolving cooperation transparency. At the initial stage with opaque information, a bargaining-power-weighted profit-sharing contract is adopted, where negotiation weights are quantified by enterprise scale, resource control and industry influence. After data transparency improves, the system switches to a Nash bargaining framework supported by blockchain carbon data sharing to realize stable long-term collaboration. Numerical cases and sensitivity analysis demonstrate that manufacturer cost information asymmetry is the primary constraint on coordination efficiency. The proposed dynamic coordination scheme effectively mitigates systemic complexity, balancing economic benefits and carbon reduction targets. This study provides practical pathways for supply chain participants to navigate complex low-carbon environments and advance sustainable, resilient supply chain operation.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14091042first seen 2026-08-26 04:40:07
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