スタグフレーションリスク下での政府規制と公平性配慮を考慮した低炭素サプライチェーンにおける価格設定と排出削減のゲーム複雑性
Game complexity of pricing and emission reduction in low-carbon supply chains with government regulation and fairness concerns under stagflation risk (原題)
Xiaobin Wang, Abudureheman Kadeer, Huanying He
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
スタグフレーション下の低炭素サプライチェーンにおいて、政府の金利規制と公平性配慮を組み込んだ動的Stackelbergゲームモデルを構築。短期的には規制が安定化に寄与するが、価格調整速度が閾値を超えるとカオスに遷移し、時間遅延フィードバック制御が安定化に有効であることを示した。政策立案への示唆を提供。
English
This study develops a dynamic Stackelberg game model for a low-carbon supply chain under stagflation, incorporating government financing-rate regulation and fairness concerns. It finds that calibrated interventions can stabilize the system short-term, but excessive price adjustment speeds lead to chaos, which time-delayed feedback control can suppress. Offers policy insights for managing supply chain instability.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではカーボンプライシング導入やサプライチェーン排出削減が課題。本モデルは政府規制の効果と限界を示し、国内政策設計や企業の価格戦略に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This research contributes to global discourse on low-carbon supply chain management under macroeconomic volatility, offering a theoretical framework for regulatory design that balances emission reduction and economic stability, relevant to carbon pricing and supply chain policies.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a novel game-theoretic model linking fairness, regulation, and chaos in low-carbon supply chains.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights risks of aggressive price adjustments and potential benefits of stable regulatory environments.
🏛政策担当者:Suggests calibrated financing-rate and fairness regulations can stabilize supply chains, but warns of instability thresholds.
📄 Abstract(原文)
Abstract Global climate and economic pressures necessitate low-carbon supply chain transitions, a process especially challenging for emerging markets and developing economies amid declining foreign investment and rising stagflation risks. This study uniquely integrates fairness concerns and stagflation risk into a nonlinear dynamical system, investigating a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer with fairness concerns. A dynamic Stackelberg game model is developed, incorporating government regulation on financing interest rates and fairness concerns. The principal findings are threefold. First, short-term analysis demonstrates the potential efficacy of government regulation within our model framework, showing that calibrated interventions via the financing rate ( $$\delta $$ ) and fairness concern adjustment coefficient (γ) can effectively guide the system toward a stable equilibrium under the specified parameter ranges. Second, long-term evolution reveals inherent instability: bounded rational strategy adjustments cause the system to cascade from period-doubling bifurcation into chaos once price adjustment speeds $$({v}_{1}, {v}_{2}$$ ) exceed critical thresholds (e.g., $${v}_{1}>0.239, {v}_{2}>0.3098$$ ), leading to severe performance deterioration. Third, the application of a time-delayed feedback control method shows promise in suppressing chaotic dynamics and restoring local stability within the simulated scenarios. These findings offer a novel theoretical lens for understanding supply chain instability and provide actionable insights for designing robust regulatory frameworks in volatile macroeconomic environments. Policymakers should manage price adjustment speeds and leverage synergistic carbon pricing and fairness regulations to mitigate instability and foster sustainable supply chain development.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-68217-yfirst seen 2026-09-09 04:59:19
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