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レバレッジとしてのリンケージ：国際気候レジームにおける非公式・間接的な「卒業」メカニズムとしてのOECD加盟

Linkage as Leverage: OECD Accession as an Informal and Indirect Graduation Mechanism in the International Climate Regime (原題)

Klaus Dingwerth, Anna Kurth

Regulation & Governance📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-10-11#政策Origin: Global
DOI: 10.1111/rego.70214
原典: https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.70214
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🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

UNFCCCの附属書I国と途上国の区分は改正が困難で「卒業」制度が欠如しているとされてきた。本稿はOECD加盟プロセスを、気候レジームとの制度的リンケージを通じた間接的・非公式な卒業メカニズムとして提示する。メキシコ（1994年）・韓国（1996年）・チリ（2010年）の加盟事例を比較し、卒業の程度に差を生む三つの因果経路と、メカニズム発動・国内支持・主要排出国のクラブ参加意欲という三条件を明らかにする。

English

The UNFCCC's Annex I divide is hard to amend, so the climate regime is often said to lack a graduation mechanism. This article shows that OECD accession functions as an indirect, informal graduation pathway via institutional linkage. Comparing Mexico (1994), South Korea (1996), and Chile (2010), it identifies three causal pathways and three conditions—activation, domestic support, and major emitters' interest in club membership—that determine how far graduation proceeds.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本はOECD加盟国として、また気候レジームでの「先進国」区分の当事者として、途上国区分の見直し圧力が自国に跳ね返る構図を理解する材料になる。SSBJ・有報開示の文脈ではないが、国際制度設計を論じる政策担当者には示唆的。

In the global GX context

Speaks directly to the global debate over differentiating responsibilities and the pressure on rising powers to take on mitigation obligations—relevant to how CBDR-RC and annex-based differentiation may evolve post-2025 and to the political economy of club-based climate governance.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:国際制度論・気候ガバナンス研究において、フォーマルな規則変更ではなく制度的リンケージを通じた漸進的変化を分析する枠組みを提供する。

🏛政策担当者:途上国区分の再編やOECD等のクラブ組織を通じた間接的な義務強化の可能性を、制度設計の選択肢として検討する材料になる。

📄 Abstract（原文）

ABSTRACT As global power is shifting, international institutions face a challenge: established powers will often request that rising powers no longer continue to benefit from their status as “developing countries”. Yet only a few institutions have formal rules in place to organize this transition. As a result, tracing the informal pathways through which change occurs becomes relevant. In this article, we study one such mechanism in the international climate regime. In that regime, the so‐called Annex I countries agreed “to take the lead” in reducing greenhouse gas emissions while developing countries remained exempt from a similar obligation. Because Annex I was hard to amend, the regime has frequently been said to lack a graduation mechanism. Yet, once we take the interaction between the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its broader institutional environment into account, the process of acceding to the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) comes into view as an indirect and informal graduation mechanism. We examine the effects and limitations of this mechanism in relation to the accession processes of Mexico (1994), South Korea (1996), and Chile (2010). Our analysis leads to two main results. First, we show that a graduation mechanism based on “linkage as leverage” existed. Second, we sketch three distinct causal pathways that lead to different degrees of graduation in each case. Overall, our study suggests that graduation based on “linkage as leverage” depends on three conditions. First, states needed to activate the mechanism in each case. Second, domestic support was required to sustain graduation. And third, major emitters had to develop an interest in joining a club organization that could exercise leverage.

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