Framework for Integrated Energy Market Trading Strategy Considering User Comfort and Energy Substitution Based on Stackelberg Game: A Case Study in China
スタッケルベルグゲームに基づくユーザーの快適性とエネルギー代替を考慮した統合エネルギー市場取引戦略の枠組み：中国におけるケーススタディ (AI 翻訳)
Lijun Yang, Baiting Pan, D. Zheng, Yilu Zhang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、中国の統合エネルギー市場において、発電事業者、運用事業者、負荷アグリゲーターの三者が参加するスタッケルベルグゲームに基づく市場取引フレームワークを提案する。ユーザーの快適性とエネルギー代替行動を定量化し、需要応答能力を維持しつつ経済効率を向上させることを示した。河北省の実データを用いた検証により、全ステークホルダーの利益を調整できることを実証した。
English
This paper proposes a Stackelberg game-based market trading framework for integrated energy markets involving an integrated energy producer, operator, and load aggregator. It quantifies user comfort and energy substitution behavior to balance economic efficiency and user welfare. A case study in Hebei Province, China, demonstrates enhanced demand response capability and improved economic benefits for all stakeholders.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
中国の統合エネルギー市場を対象とするが、日本でも需要応答やエネルギー代替を考慮した市場設計の参考となる。特に、ユーザー快適性を明示的にモデル化する点は、日本のエネルギー小売自由化後のサービス設計に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This study contributes to global energy transition literature by presenting a game-theoretic framework that integrates user comfort and energy substitution into market design. It offers a method for coordinating multiple stakeholders in regional integrated energy systems, relevant for countries developing demand-side management and renewable integration strategies.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:The Stackelberg game model with user comfort quantification provides a novel approach for multi-agent energy market optimization.
🏢実務担当者:Energy market operators can use the framework to design integrated trading mechanisms that balance economic and welfare objectives.
🏛政策担当者:Regulators can reference the model to develop policies that incentivize demand response while maintaining consumer satisfaction.
📄 Abstract（原文）
As the integrated energy market evolves toward a multi-stakeholder coexistence model, balancing economic efficiency, user well-being, and system-level sustainability among interacting stakeholders has become a key challenge, particularly in the rapidly developing regional integrated energy markets in China. Thus, to satisfy user comfort and energy substitution requirements while achieving cost-effective electricity and heating supply, this study proposes a Stackelberg game-based market trading framework involving an integrated energy producer (IEP), an integrated energy operator (IEO), and a load aggregator (LA). First, the integrated energy market framework and transaction modes are established, and the profit models of IEP and IEO are formulated. Considering users’ energy substitution behavior, user comfort is quantified to explicitly reflect user welfare in market decision making, and a consumer surplus model is developed for LA participating in market transactions. Second, a Stackelberg game framework is constructed to coordinate the strategies of all participants by incorporating source–load energy flows, and the equilibrium solution is proven to be unique and solvable using quadratic programming. Finally, a case study based on historical data from Hebei Province, China, is conducted to validate the proposed strategy. The results demonstrate that the proposed method effectively coordinates the interests of all stakeholders, enhances demand response capability without reducing user comfort, and improves economic benefits for both supply and demand sides in regional integrated energy markets.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/su18084042first seen 2026-05-15 17:00:09
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