Challenges and opportunities of solar geoengineering for climate governance
太陽地球工学の気候ガバナンスにおける課題と機会 (AI 翻訳)
Francesco Furini, Michael Finus
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本レビューは、太陽地球工学の配備に伴うガバナンス課題を整理し、自由運転問題（単独国家による一方的実施）を緩和する条件を理論モデルから検討する。投票ルールや移転スキーム、自己拘束的合意が協力を促進しうることを示し、気候緩和策との相互作用が協力強化につながる可能性を指摘する。
English
This review characterizes governance challenges of solar geoengineering deployment, examining theoretical models on the 'free-driver problem' where a single nation acts unilaterally. It finds that voting rules, transfer schemes, and self-enforcing agreements can mitigate free-driving and support cooperation, and that geoengineering may either undermine or strengthen mitigation incentives depending on conditions.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では太陽地球工学の議論はまだ初期段階だが、国際気候交渉における日本の立場形成に示唆を与える。特に、単独実施のリスクと国際協調の条件を理解することは、将来の気候政策立案に有用である。
In the global GX context
This review contributes to global climate governance scholarship by synthesizing game-theoretic insights on solar geoengineering, a topic increasingly relevant as climate impacts worsen. It offers a framework for policymakers to anticipate strategic behavior and design robust governance mechanisms, complementing existing literature on mitigation and adaptation.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a structured overview of game-theoretic models on solar geoengineering governance, identifying research gaps.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights governance mechanisms to prevent unilateral geoengineering deployment, informing international negotiation strategies.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Purpose This review characterizes the governance challenges arising from the potential deployment of solar geoengineering. The authors survey existing theoretical models that analyze the strategic incentives such technologies generate. In particular, this study examines the conditions under which the “free-driver problem”, where a single nation or small group of nations initiates solar geoengineering without the consent of the international community, might be avoided or mitigated and explores the implications for international climate governance when mitigation and solar geoengineering policies interact. Design/methodology/approach The authors focus on a subset of theoretical contributions and examine them in depth to clarify the mechanisms underlying free-driving and to explore potential solutions. Findings Overall, the literature suggests that governance mechanisms such as voting rules, transfer schemes and self-enforcing agreements can, in principle, mitigate free-driving and support stable cooperation on solar geoengineering. Theoretical models indicate that geoengineering may either undermine or strengthen incentives for mitigation and international cooperation, and under specific conditions can even facilitate the formation of large climate agreements avoiding its deployment. Originality/value By bringing together insights from public good, coalition formation and game theoretical literature, this review highlights the conditions under which cooperation can emerge and identifies key gaps for future research on the governance of solar geoengineering.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1108/irere-05-2026-0009first seen 2026-08-15 04:43:19
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