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炭素取引下における持続可能な石炭電力サプライチェーンの協調的排出削減：R&D補助金の役割

Collaborative Emission Reduction in Sustainable Coal-Power Supply Chains Under Carbon Trading: The Role of R&D Subsidies (原題)

Bo Xu, Jialu Yang, 振山 李, Jiexin Wang

Sustainability📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-10-22#炭素価格Origin: Global経営インパクト: コスト削減対象セクター: power
DOI: 10.3390/su182110736
原典: https://doi.org/10.3390/su182110736

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

炭素取引下の石炭電力サプライチェーンを対象に、石炭供給者主導のスタッケルベルグゲームで補助金配分の効果を比較した研究。一方への補助は他方の技術改善を阻害し得るため、純排出削減には補助金が閾値を超える必要がある。二重補助は両者の技術改善と協調的削減を促すが政府支出は最大となり、予算制約下では削減効率に応じた最適配分が決まる。

English

A Stackelberg game model of a coal supplier-led power supply chain under carbon trading compares no, single-firm, and dual R&D subsidies. Subsidizing one firm can discourage the other's technology improvement, so net emission cuts may require subsidies above a threshold. Well-allocated dual subsidies achieve collaborative reductions but cost most; under budget constraints, optimal allocation depends on budget size and each firm's reduction efficiency.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本では石炭火力の段階的廃止とGX推進が焦点となる中、炭素価格とR&D支援の組合せ設計はトランジション政策や企業の脱炭素投資判断に示唆を与える。

In the global GX context

As carbon pricing expands under ETS and CBAM debates, this work informs how governments can design R&D subsidies to align upstream-downstream incentives in hard-to-abate power supply chains, relevant to transition finance and just-transition policy design.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:炭素取引とR&D補助金がサプライチェーン全体の排出量に与える相互作用を理論的に捉える枠組みを提供する。

🏢実務担当者:サプライヤーと発電事業者の技術投資インセンティブが補助金設計でどう変わるかを理解する材料になる。

🏛政策担当者:限られた補助予算を一方か両方かに配分する際の、削減効率と予算規模に応じた最適設計の指針を示す。

📄 Abstract（原文）

To address the misaligned emission reduction incentives between upstream and downstream firms in coal-power supply chains under the dual carbon goals, and to promote their low-carbon transition and sustainable development, this study develops a coal supplier-led Stackelberg game model under carbon trading. With electricity output held constant, the model compares four scenarios—no subsidy, supplier-only subsidies, generator-only subsidies, and dual subsidies—and further examines subsidy allocation under a budget constraint. The results show that, under certain conditions, subsidizing one firm improves its technology but discourages technological improvement by the other firm. Consequently, subsidies may need to exceed a threshold to achieve net emission reductions. Contract acceptance conditions and the compatibility of the two technologies can alter these interactions. Appropriately allocated dual subsidies can promote technological improvement by both firms and achieve collaborative emission reductions. Under the baseline parameters and specified subsidy rates, dual subsidies yield the lowest emissions but also require the highest government expenditure. Under a budget constraint, the optimal subsidy allocation depends on the budget size and the emission reduction efficiency of the two firms and may involve supporting either one firm or both. Unspent funds may be retained when further expenditure cannot deliver additional emission reductions. This study reveals how R&D subsidies affect total supply-chain emissions through interactions between the two firms’ technology choices, providing a basis for policies that coordinate firms’ emission reduction incentives, allocate limited subsidy funds effectively, and promote sustainable development in coal-power supply chains.

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