Carbon quota financing strategies for manufacturers: repurchase versus pledge
メーカー向けカーボンクォータファイナンス戦略：買戻し型と担保型の比較 (AI 翻訳)
Cong Liu, Xiqiang Xia, Zhaohan Huang, B Wang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、排出権取引制度下で資金制約のあるメーカーが炭素クォータを活用したファイナンス手法（買戻し型と担保型）をStackelbergゲームモデルで比較。初期資本と資金調達コストが最適選択を決定し、環境面ではR&Dコスト係数が閾値を超えるとファイナンスが有利になることを示す。技術水準の向上と変動性の増大が経済・環境成果を改善する。
English
This study compares carbon quota pledge financing (CQPF) and carbon quota repurchase financing (CQRF) for capital-constrained manufacturers under cap-and-trade using a Stackelberg game. It finds that the optimal choice depends on initial capital and financing costs, and from an environmental perspective, financing becomes attractive only beyond certain R&D cost thresholds. Higher average technology levels and volatility improve both economic and environmental outcomes.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本では全国規模のキャップアンドトレード制度は未導入だが、炭素クォータを担保にした資金調達手法は、今後の制度設計や企業の脱炭素投資に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to the global literature on carbon finance by modeling innovative financing mechanisms under cap-and-trade, offering insights for markets like the EU ETS and China's national carbon market.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic framework for carbon quota financing decisions, extending carbon finance theory.
🏢実務担当者:Manufacturers can use findings to choose between repurchase and pledge financing based on their capital and cost conditions.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights how financing cost structures and R&D incentives affect carbon market efficiency, informing policy design.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Under carbon cap-and-trade, capital-constrained manufacturers can leverage carbon quotas via carbon quota pledge financing (CQPF) and carbon quota repurchase financing (CQRF). Using a Stackelberg game model, this study analyzes the optimal financing choice. Key findings reveal: 1) From both the profit and social welfare perspectives, the optimal financing approach is primarily determined by initial capital and financing costs, with CQPF preferred only when its financing cost is lower than that of CQRF. 2) From an environment perspective, financing is avoided at moderate R&D cost coefficient but becomes attractive beyond thresholds, with preference hinging on the R&D cost coefficient and financing-cost differences. 3) Higher average technology levels boost carbon emission reduction (CER) efforts, sales, and profits across all models, while greater technological volatility improves both economic and environmental outcomes. We also examine the effects of retailer risk aversion and two-manufacturer competition, providing new insights for carbon-financing strategies and related policy design.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1080/21681015.2026.2687522first seen 2026-06-18 05:49:42
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