Offsetting Carbon with Lemons: Adverse Selection and Certification in the Voluntary Carbon Market
レモンで炭素を相殺する: 自主的炭素市場における逆選択と認証 (AI 翻訳)
Vahideh Manshadi, Faidra Monachou, Ilan Morgenstern
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
企業の自主的な気候目標達成のために炭素クレジット購入が行われる自主的炭素市場（VCM）において、逆選択と不完全な第三者認証が市場の有効性に与える影響を理論モデルで分析。高品質プロジェクトと低品質プロジェクトの識別が困難な中、認証の改善や非炭素属性への選好が市場成果にどう影響するかを示す。
English
This paper develops a theoretical model of the voluntary carbon market (VCM) incorporating adverse selection, imperfect third-party certification, and buyer preferences for non-carbon co-benefits. It shows that while certification can improve market quality, it may not fully resolve inefficiencies due to noisy signals, and that buyer preferences for co-benefits can exacerbate adverse selection under certain conditions.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本企業のカーボン・クレジット活用（J-クレジット制度や海外クレジット）が増加する中、本論文はクレジットの質保証と市場設計の重要性を理論的に示しており、日本のVCM参加者や制度設計者にとって示唆に富む。
In the global GX context
As the voluntary carbon market faces scrutiny over credit quality, this paper provides a rigorous framework to understand the interplay of adverse selection and certification—directly relevant to global efforts such as the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM) and the development of high-integrity carbon credits.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Offers a formal model of adverse selection and certification in carbon markets, useful for further theoretical or empirical work on market design.
🏢実務担当者:Highlights the importance of credit quality and certification rigor when sourcing carbon credits for offsetting strategies.
🏛政策担当者:Informs regulatory approaches to ensure voluntary carbon markets deliver genuine emissions reductions through robust certification standards.
📄 Abstract（原文）
To meet voluntary climate targets, firms often complement internal decarbonization efforts by purchasing carbon credits in the voluntary carbon market (VCM), which finance projects that reduce emissions elsewhere. However, these emissions reductions are difficult to verify, and growing evidence of overcrediting has cast doubt on the VCM’s potential to genuinely offset emissions. We investigate how the VCM’s defining features shape its climate effectiveness. Our model captures three central elements: adverse selection, as high-quality projects that truly reduce emissions are costlier yet difficult to distinguish from low-quality ones; imperfect third-party certification, as projects are screened based on a noisy signal of quality; and buyer preferences for non-carbon attributes, as some firms value credits that generate observable social or economic co-benefits beyond reducing emissions.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- SSRN https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5792202first seen 2026-06-22 05:48:22
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