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Optimal supply chain collaborative compliance strategy in integrated carbon market: technology collaborative versus investment collaborative

統合炭素市場における最適なサプライチェーン協調コンプライアンス戦略:技術協調対投資協調 (AI 翻訳)

Gaoxiang Lou, Zhangzhen Fang, Linsen Yin, Zhixuan Lai, Yuhan Guo

Industrial Management & Data Systems📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-01-22#炭素価格
DOI: 10.1108/imds-08-2025-1122
原典: https://doi.org/10.1108/imds-08-2025-1122

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

本研究は、義務的および自主的炭素市場における3つのサプライチェーン協調コンプライアンス戦略(技術協調(TC)、認証排出削減(CER)投資協調(IC)、ハイブリッド戦略)を調査する。ゲーム理論を用いて最適な卸売価格、生産量、排出削減レベルを導出し、非協調と各種協調戦略を比較。TCはメーカーの利益を向上させるが、協調コストが高い場合サプライヤーに不利となり得る。ICはCER価格が低い場合効果が低い。ハイブリッド戦略はCER価格が高い場合やTCコストが低い場合にサプライヤーに、また常に高いCER価格でメーカーに好まれる。これらの知見は生産・排出削減決定および協調コンプライアンス契約の設計に貢献する。

English

This study examines three supply chain collaborative compliance strategies in an integrated carbon market: technology collaborative (TC), certified emission reduction (CER) investment collaborative (IC), and hybrid. Using game theory, the authors derive optimal decisions and compare strategies. They find that TC boosts manufacturer profit but may hurt suppliers under high collaborative costs, while IC is less effective when CER prices are low. The hybrid strategy is preferred by suppliers under high CER prices or low TC costs, and always by manufacturers under high CER prices. These findings support production and emission reduction decisions and collaborative contract design.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本では国内排出量取引制度とJ-クレジットの統合が進む中、本論文のサプライチェーン全体でのコンプライアンス戦略分析は、企業が排出量取引とオフセットを組み合わせる際の意思決定に示唆を与える。特にサプライヤーとメーカーの協調の在り方は、SSBJや有報におけるサプライチェーン排出量開示にも関連する。

In the global GX context

Globally, this paper contributes to the literature on carbon market integration and supply chain collaboration under cap-and-trade and offset mechanisms. It provides insights for firms operating in jurisdictions with linked mandatory and voluntary carbon markets, such as the EU ETS and voluntary carbon markets, and informs the design of collaborative compliance contracts.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:This paper offers a game-theoretic framework for analyzing collaborative compliance strategies under integrated carbon markets, providing insights on how different strategies affect supply chain members' profits and emission reductions.

🏢実務担当者:Corporate sustainability managers can use the findings to evaluate whether technology collaboration or CER investment is more beneficial for joint compliance, especially when considering cost structures and carbon prices.

🏛政策担当者:Regulators can note that the preference for hybrid strategies under high CER prices suggests that linking voluntary offsets with mandatory caps can incentivize collaboration, but careful design is needed to avoid adverse effects on suppliers.

📄 Abstract(原文)

This study investigates three supply chain collaborative compliance strategies under the mandatory and voluntary carbon markets: carbon emission reduction technology collaborative (TC), certified emission reduction (CER) investment collaborative (IC) and a hybrid strategy. It examines their effects on supply chain operations and carbon emission reduction decisions to identify the optimal collaborative compliance strategy in integrated carbon market. We consider a supply chain consisting of a non-emission controlling supplier and an emission-controlling manufacturer. The model combines carbon emission allowance cap-and-trade and CER offset mechanism in integrated carbon market. Using game theory modeling, we derive optimal wholesale pricing, production quantity and emission reduction levels. We then compare the performance across non-collaborative, single and hybrid supply chain collaborative compliance strategies. Compared to the non-collaborative strategy, TC enhances manufacturer profit but may not benefit the supplier when collaborative costs are high; IC is less effective for supply chain members when CER prices are low. The supplier’s and manufacturer’s preferences for TC and IC mainly depend on the total investment cost of CER, the CER price and the market-clearing price. The hybrid strategy is preferred by the supplier when CER prices are high or TC costs are low and also preferred by the manufacturer under high CER prices always. This study aims to identify the optimal supply chain collaborative compliance strategy. The findings offer support for the production, carbon emission reduction decisions, as well as the design and optimization of the collaborative compliance contracts.

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