排出権取引下の低炭素プラットフォームサプライチェーンにおける情報共有とグリーンイノベーション
Information Sharing and Green Innovation in a Low-Carbon Platform Supply Chain Under Cap-and-Trade (原題)
Guojun Ji, Jie Qin
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
プラットフォーム主導のサプライチェーンにおいて、排出権取引制度下での情報共有戦略（非共有・無償共有・有償共有）がメーカーのグリーンイノベーション水準、企業利益、総排出量に与える影響をゲーム理論で分析。需要が期待を上回る場合、情報共有はイノベーションを促進し排出を削減するが、下回る場合は逆効果。プラットフォームには有償共有が最適で、排出削減効果が需要拡大効果を上回ることを示す。
English
This study uses game theory to analyze how information-sharing strategies (no, free, paid) in a platform-led supply chain affect a manufacturer's green innovation, profits, and total emissions under cap-and-trade. When market demand exceeds expectations, sharing stimulates innovation and reduces emissions; the opposite occurs when demand falls short. Paid sharing maximizes platform profit, and emission reductions outweigh demand expansion under favorable conditions.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではカーボンプライシング導入が進む中、サプライチェーン全体での排出削減と情報共有の設計は、SSBJ開示やサプライチェーン排出量算定にも関わる。プラットフォーム企業の情報仲介が環境目標と経済目標を両立させる可能性を示唆し、政策設計や企業戦略に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to global discussions on carbon pricing and supply chain governance, particularly relevant under ISSB/CSRD disclosure requirements. It highlights the role of information sharing in aligning economic and environmental goals, offering insights for platform-based business models and policy design in the context of transition finance and carbon markets.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic framework linking information sharing, green innovation, and emissions under cap-and-trade, useful for further research on platform supply chains.
🏢実務担当者:Offers guidance on information-sharing strategies in platform supply chains to enhance green innovation and reduce emissions, relevant for corporate sustainability and supply chain management.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights how information governance can complement carbon pricing to achieve emission reductions, informing policy design for platform economies.
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study develops a game-theoretic model of a platform-led supply chain in which a manufacturer invests in green innovation under a cap-and-trade regulation. We examine how three information-sharing strategies—no sharing (NI), free sharing (FI), and paid sharing (TI)—affect the manufacturer’s green innovation level, both firms’ profits, and total supply chain carbon emissions. Our analysis reveals that the effect of information sharing is state-dependent: when the realized market potential exceeds its prior expectation, sharing stimulates green innovation, raises platform profit, and reduces emissions; when demand falls below expectations, the opposite holds. For the platform, paid sharing delivers the highest expected profit by extracting the full value of demand information. Furthermore, the emission-reducing effect of information sharing outweighs the demand expansion effect under favorable demand conditions, leading to a net decrease in total carbon emissions. These results underscore the governance role of demand information in aligning economic and environmental goals in platform supply chains, and they offer actionable guidance for managers and policymakers.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14081025first seen 2026-08-22 04:49:32
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