← 論文一覧に戻る

Production competition and carbon emissions reduction cooperation

生産競争と炭素排出削減協力 (AI 翻訳)

Zhijie Wang, Hongxia Sun

Management Decision📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-08-04#サプライチェーン経営インパクト: 調達リスク対象セクター: manufacturing
DOI: 10.1108/md-08-2025-2529
原典: https://doi.org/10.1108/md-08-2025-2529
📄 PDF

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

カーボンキャップ&トレード政策下で、独立リマニュファクチャラー(IR)間の競争と炭素排出削減(CER)協力の共存をバイフォームゲームで分析。技術優位のIRは生産・利益で優れるが排出も多い。固定認可は単位認可よりIR利益とCERに有効。消費者の低炭素選好と炭素価格上昇は利益増と排出削減に寄与するが、競争激化やCERコスト係数が高いと連合の持続性が低下する。

English

Under carbon cap-and-trade, this paper uses a biform game to analyze the coexistence of competition and cooperation in carbon emission reduction (CER) among independent remanufacturers (IRs). A technologically advantaged IR performs better in production and profit but emits more. Fixed authorization outperforms unit authorization in boosting IR profit and CER. Stronger consumer low-carbon preference and higher carbon prices enhance profit while reducing emissions, but high competition intensity and CER cost weaken coalition sustainability.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本ではカーボンプライシング導入が議論されており、リマニュファクチャリング産業の育成と排出削減の両立は政策課題。本モデルは認可モデル設計や協調促進の示唆を与え、国内の循環経済政策やサプライチェーン排出削減に参考となる。

In the global GX context

Globally, this contributes to the literature on supply chain cooperation under carbon pricing, relevant to circular economy and remanufacturing policies. It offers insights for designing authorization mechanisms and fostering CER collaboration, aligning with ISSB disclosure and transition finance trends.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:Provides a game-theoretic framework for coopetition in remanufacturing under carbon policy, useful for extending to other contexts.

🏢実務担当者:Offers guidance on choosing authorization models and forming CER coalitions to balance profit and emissions.

🏛政策担当者:Highlights the role of carbon pricing and incentives in promoting remanufacturing and CER cooperation.

📄 Abstract(原文)

Purpose Under the carbon cap-and-trade (CCT) policy, the supply chain is increasingly focused on carbon emissions reduction (CER), for which remanufacturing offers a promising pathway. However, independent remanufacturers (IRs) must first obtain remanufacturing authorization from the original equipment manufacturer, and such authorization can be granted to multiple IRs simultaneously. This setting creates a hybrid dynamic in which IRs both compete in the market and engage in cooperation to enhance CER. Therefore, it has theoretical and practical significance to study the coexistence of competition and cooperation in IRs. Design/methodology/approach This paper constructs a game-theoretic model to capture the coexistence of remanufacturing competition and CER cooperation between two IRs under different authorization models. The biform game, which integrates both non-cooperative and cooperative game stages, is applied to solve the optimal solutions and analyze the strategic interaction between competition in remanufacturing and collaboration in CER. Findings The results show that a remanufacturer with technological advantages has better performance in production and profitability but also leads to higher carbon emissions. In addition, compared with unit authorization, fixed authorization shows significant advantages in improving profit for IRs and promoting CER. It is also found that the enhancement of consumers' low-carbon preference and the increase of carbon price can effectively promote the growth of profit for IRs while reducing carbon emissions. However, when competition intensity and CER cost coefficient are high, the coalition shows poor profitability and sustainable development capability. Research limitations/implications This paper has several limitations pointing to future research directions. First, the model uses deterministic assumptions for market demand and price, but real markets have uncertainties from random factors. Second, this paper only focuses on CCT, ignoring others like carbon tax. Finally, this paper only examines CER cooperation between two IRs. However, reality may have more members and diverse cooperation fields. Practical implications This study can effectively facilitate the development of IRs in both remanufacturing production and CER cooperation. This paper analyzes the complex interplay between cooperation and competition among IRs. With the guidance of research findings, IRs can gain a clearer understanding of the essential characteristics of the coexisting relationship between cooperation and competition, thereby making cooperation and competition decision-making processes more scientific. Social implications Governments should regulate the market, guide IRs' CER cooperation via incentives, build platforms for stable coalitions and supervise carbon markets to avoid sharp price impacts. Remanufacturers should share technology and experience to boost efficiency and reduce carbon emissions. Coalitions need to explore sustainable paths and guide consumers to recognize remanufactured products. Originality/value This paper innovatively constructs a biform game model for the remanufacturing authorization supply chain to address remanufacturing competition and CER cooperation. This model provides a scientific decision-making basis for IRs to balance competition and cooperation in practical operations, realize optimal resource allocation and protect the interests of all parties. It further facilitates the collaborative development of the remanufacturing industry in enhancing production efficiency, meeting CER targets and safeguarding economic and environmental benefits, while opening up new ideas and methods for research and practice in related fields.

🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース

🔔 こうした論文の新着を逃したくない方は キーワードアラート に登録(無料・3キーワードまで)。

gxceed は公開メタデータに基づく研究支援データセットです。要約・翻訳・解説は AI 支援で生成されています。 最終的な解釈・検証は利用者が原典資料に基づいて行うことを前提とします。