戦略的裁量と環境ガバナンス：CEOパワー、制度的圧力、企業の気候リスク開示
Strategic Discretion and Environmental Governance: CEO Power, Institutional Pressures and Corporate Climate Risk Disclosure (原題)
Yongjing Gao, Norman Mohd Saleh, Jie Xu, Ying-Jian Zhao, Zhe-Wen Tao
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本研究は、CEOのパワーが企業の気候リスク開示（CCRD）に与える影響と、制度的圧力の調整効果を検証。2010〜2024年の中国A株上場企業のパネルデータ分析により、強力なCEOを持つ企業は気候リスク開示が低い傾向にあるが、政府の環境規制、メディアの注目、公衆の環境関心が高い場合にはその負の関連が弱まることが示された。さらに、移行リスク開示で負の関連が強く、専門的パワーは開示と正の関連を持つ。
English
This study examines how CEO power affects corporate climate risk disclosure (CCRD) and the moderating role of institutional pressures. Using panel data from Chinese A-share listed firms (2010-2024), it finds that powerful CEOs are associated with lower CCRD, but this negative effect is attenuated under strong government regulation, media attention, and public environmental concern. The negative association is stronger for transition risk than physical risk, and expert power positively relates to disclosure.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではSSBJ開示義務化が進む中、CEOの裁量が開示の質に与える影響は重要。本研究成果は、日本企業の開示体制設計やガバナンス強化に示唆を与える。特に、制度的圧力がCEOの裁量を制約する点は、日本の規制当局や投資家が注目すべき。
In the global GX context
This study contributes to global disclosure scholarship by highlighting the role of CEO power in climate risk disclosure, a factor often overlooked in standard-setting debates. It underscores the importance of institutional pressures in shaping transparency, relevant for ISSB and SEC contexts where managerial discretion may affect comparability.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:CEOパワーと気候リスク開示の関係を制度的圧力の観点から実証した点が参考になる。
🏢実務担当者:自社の開示戦略を検討する際、CEOの影響力と外部圧力のバランスを考慮する必要性を示唆。
🏛政策担当者:規制強化やメディア監視が開示の質を高める可能性を示しており、政策設計に有用。
📄 Abstract（原文）
This study examines the relationship between CEO power and corporate climate risk disclosure (CCRD) and the moderating role of institutional pressures in this relationship. The panel data from Chinese A‐share‐listed firms over 2010–2024 indicate that firms led by powerful CEOs disclose low levels of climate risk. However, this negative association is attenuated when firms operate under strong government environmental regulation, receive extensive media attention and face heightened public environmental concern, consistent with the view that formal enforcement and informal scrutiny constrain managerial discretion over strategically sensitive transparency choices. Our results remain robust across alternative specifications and lag structures and persist after endogeneity concerns are addressed using propensity score matching and instrumental‐variable estimation, with CEO dismissal serving as an instrument for CEO power. Additional heterogeneity tests show that the negative CEO power–CCRD association is present in SOEs and non‐SOEs and highly pronounced outside manufacturing. This notion indicates that sectoral contexts shape the extent to which executive power translates into selective transparency. Further analyses indicate that the negative association is stronger for transition risk disclosure than for physical risk disclosure. The overall effect is primarily driven by structural, ownership and prestige power, whereas expert power is positively related to disclosure. The findings have important implications for environmental policymakers, investors and the design of corporate environmental strategy in emerging markets transitioning towards standardised climate reporting.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdfdirect/10.1002/bse.71495first seen 2026-09-08 05:25:44 · last seen 2026-09-21 05:15:36
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