Carbon reduction or carbon offset? Optimal low‐carbon strategy under demand uncertainty and information asymmetry
炭素削減か炭素オフセットか？需要不確実性と情報非対称性の下での最適な低炭素戦略 (AI 翻訳)
Bo Liu, Yi Ding, Haoying Guo
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、企業が採用する直接炭素削減投資（R戦略）と炭素オフセット（O戦略）の選択を、需要不確実性と情報非対称性のゲーム理論モデルで分析。小売業者の需要情報共有がメーカーの戦略選択に与える影響を明らかにし、需要が高い場合やオフセット受容度が低い場合はR戦略が、需要が低い場合はO戦略が望ましいことを示す。情報共有は需要不確実性を低減し、実質的な排出削減を促進する。
English
This paper analyzes a manufacturer's optimal choice between direct carbon reduction investment (R strategy) and carbon offset (O strategy) under demand uncertainty and information asymmetry using a game-theoretic model. It shows that the R strategy is preferred when demand is high or consumer acceptance of offsets is low, while the O strategy is more attractive under weak demand. Information sharing reduces demand uncertainty and encourages genuine emission abatement.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
本論文は、日本の製造業が直面する低炭素戦略の選択、特にSSBJや有報でのScope 1・2削減とオフセットの扱いに関連する。情報共有の促進が実質的な排出削減につながる点は、日本企業のサプライチェーン管理に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to global GX literature by modeling the trade-off between direct carbon reduction and offsets under demand uncertainty, relevant to corporate strategies under TCFD and ISSB frameworks. The insights on information sharing can inform supply-chain carbon management and disclosure practices.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Game-theoretic model provides insights on optimal low-carbon strategy under demand uncertainty and information asymmetry.
🏢実務担当者:Useful for choosing between reduction investment and offset purchases based on demand conditions and consumer acceptance.
🏛政策担当者:Information sharing mechanisms can promote genuine reductions; relevant for designing offset credibility standards.
📄 Abstract（原文）
Abstract As environmental awareness grows, companies are rolling out emission‐reduction initiatives to offer more low‐carbon products. The two commonly adopted strategies for companies are direct carbon reduction investment (R strategy) and carbon offset (O strategy), and they differ in costs and consumer perception of their effects: the former requires substantial upfront technological investment and is therefore highly sensitive to demand fluctuations, whereas the latter involves demand‐dependent costs but may suffer from credibility concerns. The choice between them is further complicated by demand uncertainty, which is often amplified by information asymmetry, as retailers typically possess more accurate demand information. We develop a game‐theoretic model in which a manufacturer chooses a low‐carbon strategy, while a retailer decides whether to share demand information. Our results show that the optimal strategy depends jointly on market potential demand, consumer acceptance of carbon offsets, and information availability. Carbon reduction is preferred when demand is sufficiently high or consumer acceptance of offsets is low, whereas carbon offset becomes more attractive under weak demand due to lower downside risk. Information sharing reduces demand uncertainty and lowers the threshold for manufacturers to adopt carbon reduction, thereby promoting genuine emission abatement. Moreover, under a hybrid strategy, the presence of an offset mechanism encourages deeper carbon‐reduction efforts by mitigating investment risk and strengthening incentives for technological abatement.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- crossref https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.70225first seen 2026-06-23 06:12:05
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