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EU炭素国境調整メカニズム下の戦略的脱炭素化：モロッコを対象とした進化ゲームモデル

Strategic Decarbonization under the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Game Model for Morocco (原題)

BOUZAIDI TD, DAOUI F, TOUNSI S, MANOUZE Eh, MOUJTAHID S, IDALFAHIM M

Research Squareプレプリント2026-10-16#炭素価格Origin: Global経営インパクト: 調達リスク対象セクター: manufacturing
DOI: 10.21203/rs.3.rs-11195472/v1
原典: https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11195472/v1

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

EUのCBAM本格稼働を受け、モロッコの政策対応とCBAM対象輸出企業の低炭素移行を二集団進化ゲームで分析。政策支援と低炭素生産が協調均衡として安定する条件を導出し、残存CBAM負担が高いほど政府介入の閾値が下がることを示す。MRV・再エネ・トランジション・ファイナンス・炭素価格を政策レバーとして提示する。

English

A two-population evolutionary game models Morocco's policy response and CBAM-exposed exporters' low-carbon transition. Active policy and low-carbon production are jointly stable when public benefits cover costs and private transition costs fall below low-carbon gains plus avoided CBAM incidence. Higher residual CBAM burden lowers the policy threshold for adoption. MRV, renewables, transition finance and carbon pricing emerge as policy levers.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

CBAMは日本の輸出企業・SSBJ開示・炭素価格設計にも直結する論点であり、域外国の政策対応モデルは日本企業のScope3・埋め込み排出管理やカーボンプライシング検討の参考になる。

In the global GX context

Directly engages the CBAM definitive phase and its interaction with nascent carbon pricing in a trade-exposed economy, informing global debates on MRV, embedded-emissions verification and transition finance under CBAM/CSRD-adjacent regimes.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:CBAMと途上国政策対応を進化ゲームで定式化する枠組みと均衡条件を提供する。

🏢実務担当者:CBAM対象輸出企業が低炭素投資と政策支援のどちらを優先すべきか判断する材料になる。

🏛政策担当者:MRV整備・再エネ・炭素価格・トランジション・ファイナンスを組み合わせた政策設計の示唆を与える。

📄 Abstract（原文）

<title>Abstract</title> <p>The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive phase in 2026, making verified embedded emissions an increasingly relevant determinant of market access for covered imports. Morocco is a useful applied case because it combines close integration with EU value chains, a strategic fertiliser industry, a carbon-pricing system still under development, and substantial renewable-energy ambitions. This study formulates a two-population evolutionary game between an adaptive Moroccan policy response and CBAM-exposed exporting firms. The model extends the government-exporter framework by deriving the firm’s incremental CBAM incidence from sectoral EU exposure, commercial cost pass-through, the EU-domestic carbon-price gap and the emissions-intensity differential between high- and low-carbon production. Pure and mixed Nash equilibria, replicator dynamics, corner eigenvalues, nullclines, an interior saddle condition and comparative statics are derived analytically. In the economically relevant coordination regime, active policy and low-carbon production are jointly stable when public benefits cover implementation and incentive costs and when private transition costs are lower than low-carbon gains, policy support, avoided domestic penalties and avoided CBAM incidence. A higher residual CBAM burden lowers the government-activity threshold required for low-carbon adoption, whereas higher transition costs raise it. An illustrative normalised scenario verifies the analytical results without claiming empirical calibration. The framework identifies measurable quantities needed for future sector-level calibration and translates them into policy levers involving MRV, renewable energy, transition finance and carbon pricing.</p>

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