温室効果ガス排出量取引制度における執行ピラミッド
An enforcement pyramid for greenhouse gas emissions trading systems (原題)
Ying Xie, Michaël Faure
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
EU ETSと中国全国ETSを対象に、公式報告の高い遵守率の背後に潜む不遵守・執行課題を分析。応答的規制論に基づき、事業者の動機や行動に応じて執行手段を調整する「執行ピラミッド」モデルを提案する。両制度が部分的にこのモデルを体現する一方、行政コストや情報問題、規制の捕捉など限界も指摘する。
English
This article examines hidden non-compliance and enforcement gaps behind officially reported high compliance rates in GHG emissions trading systems. Drawing on responsive regulation, it proposes an ETS enforcement pyramid that lets regulators adjust tools to entities' changing motivations. It shows the EU ETS and China's national ETS partly embody this model while revealing its limitations, including administrative costs, information problems, and regulatory capture.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本ではGX-ETSやカーボンプライシング制度設計が進む中、遵守率の実効性や執行コストをどう担保するかはSSBJ開示・政策連動の観点で示唆に富む。制度の「見かけの遵守」を問う視点は国内議論に有用。
In the global GX context
As carbon markets mature under Article 6 and national ETS expansion, enforcement credibility becomes central to the integrity debate that underpins ISSB-aligned disclosure and transition finance. The paper's responsive-regulation lens adds a compliance-quality dimension often missing from global ETS scholarship.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:執行と遵守の質を測る分析枠組みとして、ETS研究に応答的規制の視点を組み込む手がかりになる。
🏢実務担当者:自社の排出報告・遵守体制が制度執行上どう評価されるかを理解し、内部統制強化に活用できる。
🏛政策担当者:GX-ETS等の制度設計で、遵守率指標の限界と執行ピラミッドの段階的措置導入を検討する材料になる。
📄 Abstract(原文)
Abstract Enforcement is crucial for ensuring compliance by regulated entities in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs). This article identifies potential non‐compliance and enforcement issues behind officially reported high compliance rates, emphasising the need to complement existing ETS enforcement strategies to enhance their effectiveness. These issues encompass the Harrington paradox in ETSs, reported quantity‐based compliance rates (which fail to reflect the number of non‐compliant entities), potential ‘black figures’ for unreported GHG emissions and potentially weak implementation of enforcement regimes. Drawing on responsive regulation, this article proposes an ETS enforcement pyramid in which regulatory agencies can adjust enforcement tools based on entities' various, changing motivations and actions. It also highlights that the enforcement regimes of the EU ETS and China's national ETS share certain features of this enforcement pyramid. The reasons why these ETSs do not fully use the pyramid model may reveal limitations in the model. These limitations include relatively high administrative costs associated with the enforcement pyramid, information problems, difficulties in shifting between cooperation and deterrence, potential waste when entities are unresponsive and issues related to regulatory capture, proportionality, equality and consistency.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- openalex https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.70102first seen 2026-11-18 05:20:29
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