Collaborative emission reduction behavior in the construction supply chain with incentive mechanism: a tripartite evolutionary game analysis
インセンティブメカニズムを備えた建設サプライチェーンにおける協調的排出削減行動：三者進化ゲーム分析 (AI 翻訳)
Wen Jiang, Anxu Wang, Min Tao, Feng Ni, Lin Zhang
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
建設サプライチェーンの低炭素化における政府・供給者・製造者の三者進化ゲームモデルを構築し、均衡戦略と主要パラメータの影響を分析。補助金には非線形の閾値効果があり、過剰な補助は政策効率を低下させる。罰則メカニズムはインセンティブより頑健で、排出削減の下限設定に不可欠。負の社会的監督が政府の厳格な監督を促す効果は正の広報より高い。
English
This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, suppliers, and manufacturers in the construction supply chain to analyze low-carbon transformation. Findings show that government subsidies have a nonlinear threshold effect, penalties are more robust than incentives, and negative public supervision is more effective than positive publicity in driving strict government oversight. The study suggests shifting policy focus from fiscal subsidies to a constraint governance framework centered on strict supervision and information disclosure.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本の建設業界では、サプライチェーン排出量の算定と削減が課題となっており、SSBJ開示やグリーン調達の要請が強まっている。本論文の知見は、補助金偏重から監督と情報開示を軸とした制度設計への転換を示唆し、日本の政策立案や企業のサプライチェーン排出削減戦略に示唆を与える。
In the global GX context
This paper contributes to global GX scholarship by modeling incentive and penalty mechanisms in construction supply chains, a sector with significant embodied emissions. Its findings on the superiority of penalties and information disclosure over subsidies align with global trends toward mandatory disclosure and regulatory enforcement, offering insights for ISSB-aligned policies and supply chain decarbonization strategies.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:進化ゲーム理論を用いたサプライチェーン排出削減の政策設計分析として、補助金と罰則の効果比較に新規性がある。
🏢実務担当者:建設サプライチェーン企業は、補助金に依存せず、罰則や情報開示を活用した協調的排出削減戦略を検討できる。
🏛政策担当者:補助金の閾値効果と罰則の重要性を示し、監督と情報開示を中心とした規制枠組みの設計に示唆を与える。
📄 Abstract（原文）
The construction supply chain balances economic and environmental benefits via low-carbon operations, yet uneven cost-benefit distribution among stakeholders hinders emission reduction efforts. This study examines stakeholder incentives and decision-making to advance low-carbon transformation. This study employs the method of evolutionary game theory. As strategies adapt dynamically to external changes, we construct a government-supplier-manufacturer evolutionary game model, analyzing equilibrium strategies and key parameter impacts. Findings reveal: (1) Government subsidies have a nonlinear threshold effect, and exceeding the optimal range will lead to a decline in policy efficiency and a decline in supervisory motivation. (2) The penalty mechanism is more robust than the incentive measures, and plays an irreplaceable and fundamental role in setting the bottom line for emission reduction and guiding system coordination. (3) Negative public supervision is a powerful force driving strict government supervision, and its effectiveness is significantly better than positive publicity. This study has clear implications for current environmental policies. Its conclusions challenge the traditional idea of over-reliance on fiscal subsidies and demonstrate the necessity and effectiveness of shifting the policy focus to build a constraint governance framework with “strict supervision and information disclosure” as the core.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- semanticscholar https://doi.org/10.1108/ecam-07-2025-1204first seen 2026-05-15 17:00:08 · last seen 2026-08-02 06:11:26
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