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リンケージ問題:排出量取引、投資協定の管轄権、炭素市場のグローバル化

The linking problem: emissions trading, investment treaty jurisdiction, and the globalization of carbon markets (原題)

Jessica Crow

Journal of International Economic Law📚 査読済 / ジャーナル2026-10-24#炭素価格
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/jgag031
原典: https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgag031

🤖 gxceed AI 要約

日本語

2024年、Koch Industriesによるカナダへの投資仲裁申立てが管轄権欠如で棄却された。本稿はこれを、炭素市場のグローバル化・リンケージに伴い再発する構造的問題との最初の遭遇と位置づける。排出量取引制度のキャップ収縮や規則変更で外国投資家の保有する排出枠が侵害された際、その法的性格が管轄権分析にどう影響するかを、二国間投資協定やエネルギー憲章条約の下で検討する。

English

In 2024 an arbitral tribunal dismissed Koch Industries' claim against Canada over Ontario's cancelled cap-and-trade programme for lack of jurisdiction. This article reads the award as the first encounter with a structural problem that will recur as carbon markets globalize and link. It traces how the domestic legal character of allowances enters jurisdictional analysis across BIT and Energy Charter Treaty configurations, operating logically prior to post-establishment regulatory-space debates.

Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.

📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters

日本のGX文脈において

日本でもGX-ETSやカーボンプライシングの本格化が議論される中、制度変更リスクと投資家保護の法的論点は、今後の制度設計や海外リンケージを検討する政策当局・企業法務にとって示唆的。

In the global GX context

As ISSB/TCFD disclosure matures and Article 6 linkages expand, this paper flags a jurisdictional risk layer beneath climate policy that investors and governments linking ETSs must anticipate—relevant to transition finance and carbon market integrity debates.

👥 読者別の含意

🔬研究者:投資協定仲裁と炭素市場リンケージの交差という新領域の分析枠組みを提供する。

🏢実務担当者:海外ETS制度変更が保有排出枠・投資に及ぼす法的リスクを法務・リスク管理で考慮する材料になる。

🏛政策担当者:ETSリンケージや制度変更設計時に、投資協定上の管轄権・保護範囲を意識した設計が求められる点を示す。

📄 Abstract(原文)

Abstract In 2024, an arbitral tribunal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a claim brought by Koch Industries against Canada arising from the cancellation of Ontario’s cap-and-trade programme. This article argues that the award should be read not as a case-specific outcome but as the first encounter in investment treaty arbitration with a structural problem that will recur with increasing frequency as carbon markets globalize and establish links. Emissions trading systems are dynamic regulatory instruments whose caps must contract, whose rules will change as governments respond to shifting political priorities, energy security pressures, and geopolitical disruption, and whose linking arrangements may be modified or terminated. When regulatory action impairs or extinguishes allowances held by foreign investors across a linked system, the domestic legal character of those allowances enters a jurisdictional analysis whose structure and decisive threshold vary according to the treaty definition, the arbitral forum, and the interpretive methodology of the tribunal. The article examines Koch v Canada as the first decided investment case and traces the mechanism through two further configurations under a broad asset-based bilateral investment treaty and the Energy Charter Treaty, demonstrating that the same instrument may or may not constitute a protected investment depending on a configuration of variables that no single actor controls and most will not have foreseen. The problem operates at a level logically prior to the post-establishment regulatory space questions that dominate the current literature on investment protection and climate policy.

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