Article 6 Carbon Markets as Tools of Neocolonial Extraction
ネオコロニアル収奪の道具としての第6条カーボン市場 (AI 翻訳)
Thelma Arko
🤖 gxceed AI 要約
日本語
本論文は、パリ協定第6条に基づくカーボン市場が、新植民地的収奪パターンを永続させることを批判的に検討する。マルクス主義と脱植民地理論を用いて、南北間の不平等な力関係を分析し、特にリベリアの事例を通じて、データインフラの欠如や規制非対称性が途上国に不利な条件をもたらすと論じる。
English
This paper critically examines how Article 6 carbon markets under the Paris Agreement perpetuate neocolonial extraction patterns. Using Marxist and decolonial frameworks, it analyses unequal power relations between Global North and South, highlighting how technical requirements and data deficits disadvantage host nations. The Liberia case study illustrates exploitative arrangements that violate community rights. The paper argues that Article 6 locks Global South into peripheral positions.
Unofficial AI-generated summary based on the public title and abstract. Not an official translation.
📝 gxceed 編集解説 — Why this matters
日本のGX文脈において
日本は第6条を活用した二国間クレジット制度（JCM）を推進しており、本論文の批判的視点は、日本のカーボンクレジット政策における公正性と透明性の確保に示唆を与える。特に、相手国との交渉過程での情報非対称性や能力格差への対応が重要であることを示唆している。
In the global GX context
This paper offers a critical perspective on carbon markets that is increasingly relevant as the global framework for Article 6 takes shape. It warns that without addressing power imbalances, carbon markets could replicate colonial patterns. For regulators and market participants, it underscores the need for robust safeguards and equitable data infrastructure.
👥 読者別の含意
🔬研究者:Provides a critical theoretical framework for analyzing power dynamics in carbon markets, useful for scholars of climate justice and political economy.
🏛政策担当者:Highlights structural inequalities in Article 6 that policymakers must address to ensure genuine voluntary cooperation and benefit-sharing.
📄 Abstract（原文）
This paper critically examines how carbon markets established under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement perpetuate neocolonial extraction patterns despite promises of "voluntary cooperation" and enhanced integrity. Through Marxist and decolonial theoretical frameworks complemented by world systems theory, I analyse how these market mechanisms reproduce unequal power relations that subordinate Global South climate and development needs to Global North interests. The analysis traces the evolution from the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism to Article 6's more complex architecture, revealing how technical requirements, regulatory asymmetries, and confidentiality provisions systematically disadvantage offset-providing nations. We demonstrate how data infrastructure deficits create conditions that facilitate resource undervaluation and continued dependency on Global North expertise and capital. The bilateral structure of Article 6.2 fragments Global South negotiating power through "divide and rule" dynamics, while regulatory disparities between Article 6.4 and 6.2 impose disproportionate compliance burdens on host nations. Using the case of Liberia's carbon agreements, we illustrate how opacity and capacity constraints enable exploitative arrangements that violate community rights. Our findings reveal that Article 6 effectively locks the Global South into a peripheral position within the world system, commodifying natural carbon-cycling capacity for Global North-controlled markets while shifting emissions reduction burdens away from historical polluters.
🔗 Provenance — このレコードを発見したソース
- SSRN https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5636656first seen 2026-07-24 05:11:38
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